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International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era

Ingrid Wuerth*
Abstract
Internationallaw is in a period of transition. After World War II, but
especially since the 1980s, human rights expanded to almost every cornerof
internationallaw. In doing so, they changed core features of international
law itself including the definition of sovereignty and the sources of
internationallegal rules. But what has been called the "age ofhuman rights"
is over, at leastfor now. Whether measuredin terms ofthe increasingnumber
of authoritariangovernments, the decline in international human rights
enforcement architecturesuch as the Responsibility to Protect and the Alien
Tort Statute, the growing power of China and Russia over the content of
internationallaw, or the rising of nationalism and populism, international
human rights law is in retreat.
The decline offers an opportunity to consider how human rights
changed, or purported to change, internationallaw and how international
law as a whole can be made more effective in a post-human rights era. This
Article is the first to argue that internationalhuman rights law as a wholewhatever its much disputed benefits for human rights themselves-appears
to have expanded and changed internationallaw in ways that have made it
weaker, less likely to generate compliance, and more likely to produce
interstatefriction and conflict. The debate around international law and
human rights should be reframed to consider these costs and to evaluate
whether internationallaw, includingthe work of the UnitedNations, should
focus on a stronger, more limited core of internationallegal norms that
protects internationalpeace and security, not human rights. Human rights
could be advanced through domestic and regional legal systems, through the
the development of non-binding internationalnorms, and through iterative
processes of internationalreportingand monitoring-amodel not unlike the
Paris ClimateAgreement.

*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Feedback welcome: ingrid.wuerth@vanderbilt.edu. For
helpful comments, thanks to Harlan Cohen, Jean d'Aspremont, Monica Hakimi, Larry Helfer, Neha
Jain, Tim Meyer, Mike Newton, Eric Posner, Anthea Roberts, Brad Roth, Chris Serkin, Ganesh
Sitaraman, Chris Slobogin, Kevin Stack, and Paul Stephan. Thanks also to participants in the 20172018 Cyber Colloquium and in faculty workshops at the Minnesota and Vanderbilt Law Schools.
Jeremiah Cioffi, Chris Gracey, and Weike Guo provided excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
During the past half-century, human rights have become central to
international law. Substantive international human rights law expanded from
a small core of initial protections after World War II to today's vast domain
reaching from foreign direct investment to climate change. With this
proliferation of norms came other, more fundamental changes. The meaning
of sovereignty purportedly shifted to focus on the individual. The sources of
international law changed so that international law now includes as "law"
many norms, especially human rights norms, that are routinely violated. This
Article argues that even as substantive human rights obligations continue to
proliferate, the more fundamental transformations of international law
through human rights have not fully taken hold and have proven costly to
international law as a whole. Applications of a variety of interdisciplinary
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tools, from empirical measures of the causes of war to domestic social
psychology, suggest that human rights-related changes to both sovereignty
and to the doctrine of sources tended to undermine interstate relations and the
"territorial peace," and to make it harder to generate compliance with many
norms of international law. These costs point to the conclusion that efforts to
transform international law around human rights should be abandoned in
favor of the development of a stronger core of international law dedicated to
protecting international peace and security rather than human rights. At a
minimum, the debate around human rights and international law should be
reframed to consider the costs of human rights to international law as a whole.
The transformation of sovereignty and international law through human
rights has stalled across several fronts, as described in Part I of this Article.
The conceptual reorientation of sovereignty to focus on the individual or on
humanity writ large provided-or was hoped to provide-the basis for
doctrinal innovations in international law to allow for the coercive
enforcement of international human rights law through foreign domestic
courts, secession, and the use of force. Institutionally, the United Nations
became increasingly focused on the enforcement of international human
rights. The conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional aspects of the human rights
enforcement architecture are all fading, however. Conceptually, traditional
sovereignty is resurgent. Institutionally, the United Nations' human rights
enforcement mechanisms appear to be largely ineffective despite decades of
reform efforts, although here the trajectory may be more stagnation than
decline. Doctrinally, innovatfons such as universal jurisdiction have
encountered growing resistance and backlash. More broadly, human rights
themselves appear to be in global decline.
The flagging efforts to transform international law and institutions
around human rights raise an additional issue addressed in Part I: the costs of
that transformation for international law. Methods of enforcing human rights
through international law as a whole have the apparent effect of undermining
the peaceful and friendly interaction of states, which is part (although not all)
of what explains the failed efforts at transformation.1 Key doctrinal
innovations in international law, such as a lack of foreign state immunity in
human rights cases, universal jurisdiction, a human right to democracy,
remedial secession, and the responsibility to protect, all arose out of the
human rights transformation of sovereignty. These enforcement doctrines
were never widely adopted, were often applied politically, became associated
with Western efforts to project power instead of universal values, and
1. This Article assumes that interstate cooperation is one objective of international law. But cf
Monica Hakimi, The Work of International Law, 58 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2017) (arguing that
conflict is not necessarily a problem for international law to overcome). It also assumes that
interstate cooperation, interstate peace, and compliance with international law provide benefits to
human kind. Barriers to interstate cooperation and to compliance with international law, as well as
war itself, thus impose what this Article terms "costs" on human kind.
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undermined interstate cooperation. There may also have been a parallel
institutional development: human rights enforcement may have contributed
to polarization within the United Nations and made it less effective overall.
Some of the doctrinal developments also undermine the territorial security
provided by international law, which may threaten what political scientists
term the "territorial peace."
Human rights did bring transformative changes to another core feature
of international law: the doctrine of sources. As Part II of this Article
describes, the effort to protect as many human rights as possible through law
led to an expansion of the two primary sources of international law-treaties
and custom. The fruits of this labor seem clear. From military intervention to
gentrification and the Greek debt crisis, every international legal issue today
is an international human rights issue.2
In practice, changes to the doctrine of sources have also meant, however,
that human rights norms are deemed part of binding international law
notwithstanding widespread violations and nonconforming behavior.
Violations of international human rights law have become rampant, ranging
from failures to comply with administrative reporting requirements to gross
violations of human dignity. Again, there is a parallel development in the
United Nations. The United Nations Security Council expanded its mandate
to include redressing and preventing human rights violations, yet such
violations continue to occur with alarming regularity. Others have questioned
whether these developments are good for human rights, but their impact
international law as a whole has gone unexamined.3 Models of state and
individual behavior, from rational choice theories, constructivism,

2. See Saki Knafo, Is Gentrification a Human-Rights Violation?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/gentrification-brooklyn-human-rights
violation/402460/ [https://perma.cc/T9QN-Y8LK]; Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Greek Crisis: Human
Rights Should Not Stop at Doors of International Institutions, Says UN Expert, U.N. HUM. RTS.
(June 2, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16032
[https://perma.cc/22GL-CQCB].
3. Other scholars have discussed the expansionist project of international human rights law, but
generally without focusing on the potential effects on international law as a whole. See, e.g., Jean
d'Aspremont, Expansionism and the Sources of International Human Rights Law, 2016 ISR. Y.B.
ON HUM. RTS. 223, 227-28 (describing the expansionist effect of international human rights law on
the doctrine of sources and the paradoxes that this creates for international human rights law);
Makau Mutua, Is the Age of Human Rights Over?, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
LITERATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 450, 451 (Sophia A. McClennen & Alexandra S. Moore eds.,
2015) ("Creeds and ideologies that overpromise-and inevitably underperform-are destined to
suffer public fatigue. Human rights is one such ideology."); Jacob Mchangama & Guglielmo
Verdirame, The Danger of Human Rights Proliferation: When Defending Liberty, Less Is More,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2013-07-24/danger
human-rights-proliferation [https://perma.cc/S3Y8-KHP7] (arguing that the expansion of
international human rights law has diluted the value of human rights). But cf Harlan Grant Cohen,
Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 92 IOWA L. REV. 65, 67 (2007)
(noting that the expansion of human rights to include norms which are routinely violated provides
"powerful fodder for those who believe that international law is meaningless").
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organizational sociology, and social psychology, all show that widespread
violations of some international legal rules likely make it more difficult to
enforce others. We might call this a "broken windows" theory of international
law.
The present decline of international human rights law-however broad
and durable it may be-accordingly presents an opportunity to reframe the
normative debate about human rights and international law, as discussed in
Part III. That extensive and inconclusive debate has focused almost entirely
on whether international law is an effective way to promote human rights.
The broken windows problem, the effect of human rights enforcement on
interstate relations, the empirical work on the "territorial peace," and
problems with polarization and credibility all demonstrate, however, that
human rights impose costs on the international legal system. Just as human
rights may benefit from being part of an international legal system, this
Article illustrates that the system itself may be weakened through the
inclusion of human rights. Those costs suggest that international law should
become focused on a core set of stronger, more effective norms that promote
international peace and security, not human rights. They also suggest that we
should explore with more creativity and vigor ways to advance human rights
that do not rely upon the coercive enforcement of binding international law;
proposals for doing so can draw on the important work of human rights
scholars who have focused on domestic processes and insitutions and their
relationship to international norms.
This Article can reframe the debate around international law and human
rights, but it will not resolve it. The benefits of international human rights
law for human rights are themselves contested, an issue that this Article
discusses, but does not seek to resolve. A second important variable not fully
explored in this Article is the extent to which human rights can today, thanks
in part to the success of the international human rights movement, be
enforced through domestic and regional law, and soft international
commitments. This Article does not purport to resolve those issues; it
endeavors instead to show that the debate about human rights should expand
to consider the relationship between human rights and international law as a
whole.
To begin, a few clarifications about terminology: "International human
rights law" refers in this Article to international law governing the
relationship between states and their own citizens; excluded are regional
human rights instruments and most of international criminal law, although
both fields see related developments,4 and both are noted at various places in
the Article.
4. Regional human rights systems and international criminal law are also undergoing some level
of backlash and decline. See, e.g., Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority ofthe European
Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and
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The terms "decline" and the "post-human rights era," do not mean we
are at the end of human rights obligations themselves (indeed, they are
multiplying), but instead that we have seen the end of an era: what Makau
Mutua has termed the "age of human rights" or what Louis Henkin called the
"Age of Rights" in international law.5 Temporal baselines vary slightly from
section to section, but for the most part the decline is measured from a
baseline period in the late 1990s. In most of the doctrinal areas described
here, decline began in the middle or end ofthe first decade of the twenty-first
century. 6 In some sections stasis is a more accurate term than decline, and to
some extent the transformations themselves were more aspirational than on
the-ground realities, so that perhaps the golden age was never so golden. Nor
do the terms "decline" and "post-human rights era" preclude the possibility
that international human rights enforcement is gaining ground in discrete
areas, or that it will someday have a second golden age so that the process is
really a dialectic, not heyday and crash. Nevertheless, contemporary political
events and decades-long stasis and decline in enforcement architecture have
come together to produce an especially difficult period for international
human rights law. The Article focuses on the primary international legal
enforcement mechanisms for human rights and on the United Nations
because they are important to human rights, to international law, and to the
claim that sovereignty has been transformed.
Finally, this Article is about the costs of human rights to international
law as a whole. Its purpose is to advance our overall understanding of how
best to strengthen international law while at the same time ensuring that
people everywhere enjoy lives of dignity and well-being. It builds on the
work of human rights scholars who have repeatedly questioned the
Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 167-68, 170; Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity
and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100. CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1119 (2015);
Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to
Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 494 (2011); Somini Sengupta, As 3 African
Nations Vow to Exit, International Court Faces Its Own Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/africa/africa-international-criminal-court.html
[https://perrna.cc/BBJ5-ZEBC]. But cf Karen J. Alter et al., A New International Human Rights
Court for West Africa: The ECO WAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 738
(2013). This Article discusses universal jurisdiction, which is one aspect of international criminal
law, because there is no clear line between civil and criminal remedies in the universal-jurisdiction
case law. See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal
Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 153 (2006).
5. Makau Mutua, Is the Age of Human Rights Over?, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
LITERATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 450-58 (Sophia A McClennen & Alexandra Schultheis Moore
eds., 2016); see generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
6. Other scholars have asked whether there is a present "decline" in the "international rule of
law," a term that describes changes in international law that accelerated during the 1990s and are
based in part on a "liberal human rights vision." Heike Krieger & Georg Nolte, The International
Rule of Law-Rise or Decline?-Points of Departure 8-9, 1 3 (KFG Working Paper Series, No. 1,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/Papers.cfrn?abstract_id=2866940 [https://perma.cc/PAC7YVXDJ.
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effectiveness of various international enforcement mechanisms 7 and on
scholarship analyzing how domestic politics and institutions, as well as
iterative engagement with international institutions, contribute to the
development and efficacy of human rights norms. 8 This Article provides
additional reasons, beyond human rights themselves, to explore means other
than binding international law through which human rights might be realized.
Other authors have called for creativity and for the development of new
frameworks to advance the cause of human rights9-this Article provides
additional impetus for doing so.
I.

International Human Rights: Costs to Peace and Friendly Relations
Human rights are often viewed as a foremost achievement of modem
international law. 10 The protection and promotion of human rights are central
to much of the work of the United Nations today, a striking expansion from
both the interwar League of Nations and the immediate post-World War II
period. 11 Human rights are even said to have transformed international law
itself. International law was once understood as a discrete set of rules derived
from consent of sovereign states and designed to facilitate their peaceful
interaction. 12 Today, by contrast, sovereignty and international law
purportedly derive their legitimacy from individuals. 13
7. See, e.g., infra text at notes 14-17, 185-90,214-25.
8. See, e.g., Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?:
Evidencefrom the Convention Against Torture 14-15 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
15-55,
2016),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cosettecreamer/files/creamersimmons_
catselfreporting_feb2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BXH-AX8M]; Grainne de Burca, Human Rights
Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 299-304 (2017); Katerina Linos & Tom Pegram, What
Works in Human Rights Institutions?, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2017).
9. See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Beyond the Human Rights Measurement Controversy, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2018); Philip Alston, Human Rights in the Populist Era,
JusTSECURITY (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46049/human-rights-populist-era/
[https://perma.cc/XJ4U-K8QH].
10. See James Crawford & Marti Koskennierni, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW I, 16 (James Crawford & Marti Koskennierni eds., 2012); STEVE
RATNER,THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (2015).
11. See STEVEN L.B. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 1960s,
DECOLONIZATION AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL VALUES 5-8, 37-47 (2016).
12. See, e.g., Olivier Barsalou, The Cold War and the Rise of an American Conception of
Human Rights, 1945-8, in REVISITING THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 362, 364-65 (Pamela
Slotte & Miia Halme-Tuornisaari eds., 2015); Krieger & Nolte, supra note 6, at 8; Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413,419 (1983).
13. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 287,288 (2017) (arguing in the context of humanitarian intervention that international
law should "serve human purposes-including the protection of human rights, not just the territorial
sovereignty of states"); RUT! TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 8-11 (2011) (arguing that the "state
centered" vision of international law is being transformed by "a normative order that is grounded in
the protection of humanity"); BRAD R. ROTH,SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
91 (2011) (noting that "modern" sovereignty is often understood as circumscribed by human rights);
Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Q of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513,514 (2009) (arguing
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Despite its ubiquity and its many successes, international human rights
law is under growing attack. To begin, scholars question, with what appears
to be increasing force and from a variety of perspectives, how effective
international law actually is at safeguarding individual human rights; 14 new
analyses have thrown into question the historical pedigree often claimed for
international human rights law, including its "glorious, triumphalist"
narrative; 15 and questions persist about the Western, imperial "civilizing
mission" of the human rights movement. 16 A new study shows how the
pursuit of human rights and other aspects of liberal internationalism
undermined U.N. peacekeeping efforts. 17
Second, according to many experts, human rights conditions are also in
global decline. In the past decade, internationally protected civil and political
rights have suffered a downturn as measured by a number of states
experiencing a decline in rights protection. 18 The number of countries in
that "the normative status of sovereignty is derived from humanity," that "humanity is the A and n
of sovereignty," and that "sovereignty remains foundational only in a historical or ontological
sense"); W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 876 (1990) (finding that it is no longer a
''per se" violation of state sovereignty when some states make "externally motivated actions" to
remove an "unpopular government," but requiring an inquiry into the actions' underlying motives);
Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 1999),
http://www.economist.com/node/324795 [https://perma.cc/G8YA-L5Y5] ("States are now widely
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa."); see also JEAN L.
COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 2-4 (2012) (summarizing the claim that the international legal order is no
longer based upon the sovereign equality of states and state consent, but instead upon human
dignity).
14. E.g., SURYA SUBEDI, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: REFORM
AND THE JUDICIALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2017); ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING TO PROTECT:
THE UN AND THE POLITICISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, FAILING TO
PROTECT]; STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ix (2013); ERIC POSNER, THE
TwiLIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014); see also de Burca, supra note 8 at 279 (describing
academic scholarship harshly critical of international human rights, some of it by scholars who are
"'insiders' to the human rights system."). Earlier work in this vein includes Oona Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002), and Laurence R. Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
15. CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2015); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 57 (2010).
16. Mutua, supra note 5, at 455; see also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The
Metaphor ofHuman Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201 (2000).
17. EMILY PADDON RHOADS, TAKING SIDES IN PEACEKEEPING: IMPARTIALITY AND THE
FuTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2-3 (2016).
18. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2016/17: THE STATE OF
THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS 12-13 (2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
POL1048002017ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/B4X2-89LP] (describing 2016 as "a year of
unrelenting misery and fear" and as witness to "the idea of human dignity and equality, the very
notion of a human family, coming under vigorous and relentless assault"); FREEDOM HOUSE, 2017,
at 1 (2017) [hereinafter FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2017], https://freedomhouse

2017]

International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era

which human rights are at "extreme risk" has increased from twenty in 2008
to thirty-five in 2015.19 Although harder to measure because most economic
and social rights are framed in relative terms, 20 it appears that these kinds of
rights have also suffered a setback.21 Empirical measures of human rights are
generally contested, in part because an apparent decline might be due to better
reporting and monitoring.22 It is clear, however, that a wide variety of
observers report a recent and serious rise in human rights violations in many
of the world's powerful and/or regionally important countries such as China,
Russia, India, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Venezuela, Egypt, and
Philippines.23 In these countries, power is increasingly centralized around a
[https://perma.cc/X75N-FYS7]
.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf
(describing 2016 as "the 11th consecutive year in which declines outnumbered improvements");
Kenneth Roth, The Dangerous Rise ofPopulism: Global Attacks on Human Rights Values ("[T]oday
a new generation of populists is turning [human rights] protection on its head."), in HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH:
WORLD
REPORT
2016,
at
1
(2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017 -web.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9HVR-H3BX]; see also John Kerry, Preface to U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES
(2015),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2015humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper [https://perma.cc/M49Y-CQPD] (emphasizing that the
abuses of human rights originated from "governments crack[ing] down on the fundamental
freedoms" and observing an "accelerating trend by both state and nonstate actors to close the space
for civil society'').
19. Human Rights Risk Atlas 2015, VERISK MAPLECROFT (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2014/12/03/human-rights-deteriorating-most
ukraine-thailand-turkey-due-state-repression-civil-unrest-maplecroft-human-rights-risk-atlas/
[https://perma.cc/D6C9-38DX].
20. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (requiring state parties to "take steps" to
"progressively'' achieve the realization of individuals' social and economic rights).
21. See Rights in Crisis, CTR. ECON. & Soc. RTS., http://www.cesr.org/rights-crisis
[https://perma.cc/RM9Y-2BMM] (reporting on governments' failure to protect people's social and
economic rights during serious economic crises).
22. Compare FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2017, supra note 18 with MARK GIBNEY ET AL., THE
POLITICAL TERROR SCALE 1976--2015 (2016), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org [https://perma
.cc/EMV8-8TK5] (using different measurement systems). See also Christopher J. Fariss, Respect
for Human Rights Has Improved over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability,
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014) (arguing that changes in how agencies interpret human rights
reports may mask improvements in human rights outcomes); Christopher J. Fariss, The Changing
Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between Human Rights Treaty
Ratification and Compliance, BRIT. J. POL. SCI., July 2017, at 1, 28 (finding a robust positive
relationship between improving levels of respect for human rights and ratification of human rights
treaties when the changing standard of accountability is taken into consideration). But cf Adam S.
Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Influence of History on States' Compliance with Human Rights
Obligations, 56 Va. J. Int' L. 211 (2016) (arguing that historical institutions, events, and conditions,
not the ratification of human rights treaties, may explain improvements in human rights practices).
23. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: WORLD REPORT 2016, at 466--77 (2016),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9FG7-K8S3]; Steven A. Cook, How Erdogan Made Turkey Authoritarian Again, ATLANTIC
(July 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made
turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/ [https://perma.cc/UT8U-KMQC]; Muhammad Mansour, Why
Sisi Fears Egypt's Liberals: Behind the Recent Crackdown on Civil Society, FOREIGN AFF.
(May 18, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-05-18/why-sisi-fears-egypts-
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strong leader who tolerates little dissent. 24 Moreover, populist leaders
recently elected in Britain and the United States are openly critical of
international human rights norms. 25 Citizens of mature democracies are
becoming less satisfied with their form of government. 26 Whether generally
termed an "authoritarian resurgence," or "the coming illiberal order"-the
trend appears clear. 27 As Philip Alston puts it: "[t]he world as we in the
human rights movement have known it in the recent years is no longer."28
There is a third way of considering the general state of human rights and
of international human rights law in particular: the decline of what one might
term the "architecture" for the international legal enforcement of human
rights. That enforcement architecture is built conceptually upon the
redefinition of sovereignty as based upon a responsibility towards individuals
and their universally acknowledged human rights. This conceptual
foundation provided the basis for doctrinal innovations in international law
designed to facilitate the coercive enforcement of a variety of human rights
liberals [https://perma.cc/3SWL-LYHJ]; Kati Marton, Hungary's Authoritarian Descent, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/opinion/hungarys-authoritarian
descent.html?mcubz= l [https://perma.cc/BP4H-3FD6]; Andrew J. Nathan, Who is Xi?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (May 12, 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/12/who-is-xi/ [https://perma
.cc/7HDV-24XS]; Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte Says He 'Doesn't Give a S *"' "' About
Human Rights' as 3,500 Killed in War on Drugs, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-doesnt
[https://perma.cc/KSL5give-a-s-about-human-rights-war-on-drugs-civilians-a7365l56.html
4X2Y]; Orville Schell, Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/crackdown-in-china-worse-and-worse/
[https://perma.cc/TC9D-YNGM]; Francisco Toro, It's Official: Venezuela Is a Full-Blown
Dictatorship, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global
opinions/wp/2016/ 10/21/its-official-venezuela-is-a-dictatorship/?utm_term=.60fc6acef963 [https:
//perma.cc/WBN6-WMED].
24. See, e.g., Javier Corrales, Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at
37, 37-38; Abbas Milani, Iran's Paradoxical Regime, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at 52, 52; Lilia
Shevtsova, Forward to the Past in Russia, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at 22, 23; Frederic Wehrey,
Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at 71, 71-72; see also sources cited
supra note 23.
25. See Anushka Asthana & Rowena Mason, UK Must Leave European Convention on Human
Rights, Says Theresa May, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
20l 6/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum
[https://perma.cc/FXK2-GV4X]; Jonathan Swan, Trump Calls for "Hell of a Lot Worse than
Waterboarding", HILL (Feb. 6, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/gop-primaries/268530trump-calls-for-hell-of-a-lot-worse-than-waterboarding [https://perma.cc/NG7T-F78N]; Daniel
White, Read Donald Trump's Ohio Speech on Immigration and Terrorism, TIME (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://time.com/4453 l l 0/donald-trump-national-security-immigration-terrorism-speech/
[https://perma.cc/4XFV-SPXY].
26. Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Democratic Disconnect, J. DEMOCRACY, July
2016, at 5, 5.
27. Michael J. Boyle, The Coming Illiberal Order, SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY,
Apr.-May 2016, at 35, 36-39; see also Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 141, 147 (describing the erosion of democracy that has occurred around
the world with the rise of abusive rulers).
28. Alston, supra note 9.

2017]

International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era

norms through foreign domestic courts, secession, and the use of force.
Institutionally, all branches of the United Nations became increasingly
focused on the enforcement of human rights law as central to their mission,
including the Security Council, which is nominally charged instead with the
protection of international peace and security.
The doctrinal and institutional aspects of the human rights enforcement
architecture have entered a period of setbacks and retrenchment, which is the
focus of the rest of Part I. More important than the specifics of each doctrine,
or the possibility that one or more may see a resurgence (or never had a
heyday at all), is the broader pattern and the views of states as a whole. This
Part shows that states lack a serious commitment to the enforcement of
human rights as international law-such enforcement has often been
perceived as selective and political and has imposed costs on the peaceful
interaction of states.
A.

Doctrinal Innovations and Their Costs

The human rights-driven transformation of international law and
sovereignty has generated specific doctrinal changes-including limitations
on state immunity, universal jurisdiction, the right to democracy, the right to
remedial secession, and humanitarian intervention/Responsibility to Protect
(R2P).29 These innovations limit the protections afforded to sovereigns by
doctrines such as immunity, jurisdiction, the sovereign equality of states, and
prohibitions on the use of force. The changes are based on the conceptual
redefinition of sovereignty (or of international law itself) as legitimate only
to the extent it reflects popular choice and to the extent it protects and
promotes individual human rights. The traditional understanding of
sovereignty, by contrast, affords all sovereign states exclusive control over
their territory and includes the "principles of sovereign immunity, domestic
jurisdiction, and nonintervention. "30 The move from the traditional to the
human rights-based understanding of sovereignty is described in different
ways using different terminology, and it is often seen as part of a broader
diminution in the significance of the nation-state itself in both international
law and politics.31 Whatever the terminology and however sweeping the

29. The human rights-related changes to public international law go beyond those explored
here. Others include the development ofjus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations, the growth
of international criminal law, changes in the law of war, and an increase in non-consensual
international legal norms. For a detailed discussion, see THEODORE MERON, THE HUMANIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-209, 247-301 (2006). These changes fall outside this Article's focus
on international human rights enforcement mechanisms and on the doctrine of sources. Jus cogens
norms are addressed briefly in the text at notes 43-45.
30. Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, ETHICS & INT'L
AFF., Dec. 2004, at 1, 7.
31. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for Sovereignty Today, 1 As!AN J. lNT'L L. 61,
62-65 (2011); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2040-42 (2003).
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global changes, all acknowledge the shift in sovereignty and international law
towards the individual and the protection of people.32
The five doctrinal innovations, which were advanced with most
enthusiasm in a period from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, are all
experiencing decline or stasis. They all also appear to harm interstate
relations--or at least states say that they do. A right to remedial secession,
for example, would permit oppressed groups who are the victims of extreme
human rights abuses to use violence and break apart from the state to which
they belong. The cost to international peace is part of the doctrine itself. In
other respects, however, the doctrines generate indirect costs for international
relations, such as problems with selective enforcement or the diminution of
the principle of sovereign equality of states. These problems increase the
potential for international friction and thus increase the possibility of
instability or even military conflict, as illustrated by the actual efforts to
implement all five doctrinal innovations.
1. Immunity.-Immunity is a long-standing, classic doctrine of public
international law based on "the sovereign equality of states" and described as
"one of the clearest examples of the 'statist' nature of international law."33
Beginning in the late 1990s, immunity appeared to be of declining application
in cases alleging violations of international human rights law. A reversal of
course began in early 2010, and today it seems well-established that
immunity applies in human rights cases just as it does in other litigation
against foreign states or their officials.
International law provides several kinds of immunity to states and the
individuals who work on their behalf. The most important, at least in terms
of economic impact, is the immunity states themselves enjoy from suit in
foreign domestic courts, a form of immunity that also extends to some
individual government officials.34 State immunity has exceptions, including
one for litigation related to a state's commercial activity. 35 The purpose of
state immunity is to ensure the peaceful coexistence of states and to minimize

32. Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1999); Krieger & Nolte, supra note 6, at 13; see also MERON,
supra note 29, at 5 (noting that, since the 19th century, the international law of war has increasingly

embodied humanitarian constraints).
33. Menno Kamminga, Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on
General International Law, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 14 (Menno T. Kamminga & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); see also TEITEL, supra note 13,
at 38-39; Paul Christoph Bomkamm, State Immunity Against Claims Arising from War Crimes:
The Judgment of the International Court ofJustice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 13
GER. L.J. 773, 779-82 (2012).
34. Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 388, 388-89 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNlTED STATES§ 453
(AM. LAW INST. 1986).
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interstate friction. As a leading scholar and judge put the point: "[t]here is no
more important way to avoid conflict than by providing clear norms as to
which state can exercise authority over whom, and in what circumstances."36
Scholars and activists have long argued that state immunity should not
apply in suits or prosecutions alleging human rights violations. 37 At the state
to-state level, efforts to develop such an exception never gained much
traction.38 But around the tum of the twenty-first century, developments in a
handful of domestic and regional courts appeared to support the claim that an
exception was in the making. Most prominently, the House of Lords denied
immunity to Augusto Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile. 39 The decision
cleared the way for the extradition of Pinochet to Spain for trial on criminal
charges of torture committed during his rule, although the U.K. government
ultimately refused to send him to Spain for health reasons.40 The Law Lords
offered a variety of rationales for their ruling, including some which would
apply broadly to claims of human rights violations against states.41 Shortly
thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights held in a nine-to-eight
decision that international law afforded Kuwait immunity from a suit in
English courts alleging torture.42 But the dissenters, and many scholars,
reasoned that because torture violates )us cogens norms, a state which
allegedly committed torture "cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in this
case, those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the illegality of
its actions."43
Cases from Italy and Greece pointed in the same direction, at least
initially. The most significant, Ferrini v. Germany,44 denied immunity to
36. ROSALYN HIGGINS,PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE USE
IT 56 (1994); see also Wickremasinghe, supra note 34,at 389 (swnmarizing the underlying rationale
for sovereign immunity as facilitating "processes of communication between States on which
international relations and cooperation rely'').
37. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403,406, 419-25 (1995)
(arguing for an exception to foreign sovereign immunity in the United States in cases alleging
"torture, genocide,or enslavement").
38. See, e.g., Loma McGregor, State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437,
441-43 (2006) (highlighting the reluctance of Canadian and British courts to allow exceptions to
sovereign immunity even in cases ofjus cogens violations).
39. Reg. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1
AC (HL) 147 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter Ex parte Pinochet]. For a detailed discussion of
this case, see generally Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 731
(2012).
40. Wuerth, supra note 39, at 735-36.
41. Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 39, at 112 (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and
Caflisch joined by Judges Wildhaber,Costa,Cabral Barreto, and Vajic).
42. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,2001-XI Eur. Ct. R.R. 79.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Ferrini v. Fed. Republic of Ger., Cass., sez. plen., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, 87 R!VISTA DI
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [RDI] 539 (2004) (It.) (reported by Andrea Bianchi at 99 AM. J. INT'L
L. 242 (2005)).
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Germany in a civil case alleging forced labor during World War IL 45 In
response, Germany sued Italy before the International Court of Justice
alleging that the Italian judgments violated customary international law.46
The ICJ held for Germany. Its decision focused in part on the purpose and
values served by state immunity, including the "sovereign equality of
States, . . . one of the fundamental principles of the international legal
order."47 On the heels of the Germany v. Italy decision, the European Court
of Human Rights held in Jones v. United Kingdom48 that customary
international law afforded immunity to an individual Saudi official who
allegedly committed torture and who was sued in a civil suit in the U.K.49
As international law stands today, immunity applies in suits alleging
human rights violations as it does in other cases. The reversal of momentum
is due in part to interstate friction caused by domestic court cases against
foreign individuals accused of human rights violations.50 There continues to
be a significant constituency seeking to limit immunity in human rights
cases,51 national court decisions in Italy have found the Germany v. Italy
decision inconsistent with the Italian legal order, 52 and a South African court
recently concluded that sitting heads of state could be prosecuted in South
Africa for some crimes, although such prosecutions would violate customary
international law.53 The issue has certainly not gone away. But as a
"fundamental principle of the international legal order," designed to facilitate

45. Id.; see also Prefecture of Victoria v. Fed. Republic of Ger., Areios Pagos [A.P.J [Supreme
Court] 11/2000 (Greece) (reported by Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas at 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 1998
(2001)) (denying Germany's sovereign immunity defense in a human rights case).
46. See generally Jurisdictional Immunities of the State(Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 20121.C.J. Rep.
99 (Feb. 3).
47. Id. at 123, 'If 57.
48. Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
49. See id. at 68.
50. See U.N. Secretariat, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction,
Memorandum by the Secretariat, 'If 150 n.419, Int'! Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596(Mar. 31,
2008); see also Belgium Scales Back/ts War Crimes Law Under U.S. Pressure, N.Y. TIMES(Aug. 2,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/02/world/belgium-scales-back-its-war-crimes-law-under
us-pressure.html?mcubz=1 [https://perrna.cc/U33D-J2R7].
51. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States
Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J: TRANSNAT'LL. 1141, 1151(2011)(" . . . [O]fficial immunity
law will need to take into account the human rights revolution.").
52. Simoncioni v. Repubblica Federale di Germania, Corte cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n.238,
Gazzetta Ufficiale [G.U.] (ser. Spec.) n.45, 29 ottobre 2014, I, 1, http://www.
[https://
cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recentjudgments/S238_2013_en.pdf
perrna.cc/9SW4-LV9T] (reported by Riccardo Pavoni at 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 400 (2015)). For a
detailed discussion of this case, see Note, Constitutional Courts and International Law: Revisiting
the Transatlantic Divide, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1371-72 (2016).
53. ,See Minister ofJustice and Constitutional Dev. v. S. African Litig. Ctr. 2016(4) BCLR 487
(SCA) at 507 para. 49, 522 para. 84-85, 528-29 para. 103 (S. Afr.) (holding that the South African
law that implemented the Rome Statute did not provide head-of-state immunity to those charged
with international crimes under the statute).
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the peaceful coexistence of states, the international law of immunity is of
ongoing significance.54
2. Universal Jurisdiction.-Universaljurisdiction was another doctrinal
facet of the changing definition of sovereignty.55 It, too, began to decline
about a decade ago and today appears to be in a period of stasis at best. 56
Universal jurisdiction allows any state to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
and apply its laws, even if there is no traditional basis (such as territory or
nationality) for doing so.57 Universal jurisdiction seemed like a promising
way to ensure the prosecution of, and civil remedies against, many
individuals who violated basic human rights norms such as torture and
genocide.58 In practice, however, the doctrine has-like other methods of
enforcing international human rights-been applied selectively based on
political calculations, leading to international friction.
Universaljurisdiction cases that go forward are generally those brought
against defendants from weak, poor states or states that have been vilified by
the world community as a whole-the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda serve
as examples.59 In many universal jurisdiction cases, the executive branch
(including prosecutors) of the forum state plays an important role in case
selection or has the power to veto cases altogether.60 It often exercises its
discretion to have cases dismissed when the defendant is from a powerful

54. Ger. v. It., 2012 I.C.J. at 123; see also ROTH, supra note 13, at 221-24 (arguing that
nullification of immunity and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction have the potential to erode
the international legal order).
55. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 13, at 58-61; see also Carly Nyst, Solidarity in a
Disaggregated World: Universal Jurisdiction and the Evolution ofSovereignty, J. lNT'L L. & INT'L
REL., Fall 2012, at 36, 38-39, 47 (surveying the history of the universal jurisdiction doctrine and
exploring its role within the larger debate on the changing conception of sovereignty).
56. See, e.g., Mark Ellis, Exec. Dir., Int'! Bar Ass'n, The Decline of Universal Jurisdiction-Is
It Reversible?, Remarks at the 10th Annual Ruth Steinkraus-Cohen International Law Lecture 5, 8
22,
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.unawestrninster.org.uk/pd£'grot12_mark_ellis_1ecture.pdf
[https://perma.ccNT92-CNRE] ("As much of the international community promotes universal
jurisdiction, state practice is limiting the scope and use of it.").
57. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV.
785, 788 (1988).
58. See id. at 788, 828-29, 837 (tracing the rise of the universal jurisdiction doctrine as a tool
"to combat egregious offenses that states universally have condemned").
59. See Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and
the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. lNT'L L. 1, 3, 8-9 (2011)
(collecting universal jurisdiction cases and finding that three-quarters of all defendants tried have
been Rwandans, former Yugoslavs, or Nazis); cf TRIAL INT'L ET AL., UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
ANNUAL REVIEW 2016: MAKE WAY FOR JUSTICE 49-51, 69 (2017) (reporting that seven out of
twenty pending universal jurisdiction cases, including those under investigation, involved conduct
in Iraq or Syria).
60. See Langer, supra note 59, at 11-12 (examining German legislation); id. at 15-16
(examining English and Welsh statutes); cf id. at 19-20 (comparing discretion afforded to the
investigating judges under French criminal law).
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country or the case would otherwise impose foreign policy costs on the forum
state.61
A survey of universal jurisdiction cases against Chinese nationals, for
example, shows numerous potential cases arising out of severe human rights
violations in Tibet and against the Falun Gong. 62 In case after case, however,
prosecutors dismissed the claims or, failing that, legislatures passed new laws
to ensure that Chinese defendants would not stand trial.63 German litigation
against Donald Rumsfeld on allegations of torture has similarly gone
nowhere, again because of the intervention or control of German government
officials.64 Litigation in Spain against U.S. officials for conduct in
Guantanamo has fared no better.65
The disproportionate focus on African defendants led to complaints
from individual African countries and from the African Union.66 The
Assembly of the African Union noted that the "abuse" of universal
jurisdiction could "endanger [i]ntemational law, order and security" and
declared that "[t]he political nature and abuse of the principle of universal
jurisdiction by judges from some non-African States against African leaders,
particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of these States. "67 Putting aside whether these criticisms are valid,
the point here is that, as with other doctrinal innovations, the selective
application of universal jurisdiction has led to political friction and the
doctrine itself is in apparent retreat. 68
International human rights litigation in the United States followed a
similar course. The Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena
Irala69 opened the door for a wide range of human rights cases to go forward

61. Id. at 5-o.
62. Eric L. Hwang, China: The Growth of a New Superpower and the Extinction of Universal
Jurisdiction, WIS. INT'L L.J. 334, 344-46, 348 (2014).
63. See, e.g., Stewart M. Patrick, Spain's Welcome Retreat on Universal Jurisdiction, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 14, 2014),http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/02/14/spains-welcome-retreat
on-universal-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/KDB3-PF82]; cf Hwang,supra note 62,at 348-49,353
(describing the hesitation to exercise universal jurisdiction over Chinese defendants).
64. See Katherine Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold Donald
Rumsfeld and Other High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1087, 1104-06 (2009).
65. Charles Chemor Jalloh, Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary
Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction, 21 CRIM. L.F. 1,56 (2010).
66. Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public
Law Litigation After Kiobel,64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1043 (2015).
67. Karinne Coombs, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly
International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 419,442 (2011) (quoting African Union,
Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction,
,i 5 (i}-(ii), Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI) (July 2008)).
68. See Patrick, supra note 63 (noting that Spain's Parliament voted to curb its judges' authority
to exercise universal jurisdiction). See generally ROTH,supra note 13, at 271.
69. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

2017]

International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era

under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS became the primary vehicle for
expansive human rights litigation in the United States.70 It also attracted
worldwide attention and generated a cottage industry of litigators and
scholars.71 Jurisdictionally, the extraterritorial application of the statute was
said to rest on universal civil jurisdiction.72 But the Supreme Court
substantially curtailed ATS litigation in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., which applied the presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes to the ATS. 73 The Court justified its decision in part by noting that if
the ATS provides a "cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of
another sovereign," it could result in "diplomatic strife."74 In support, the
Court cited to "[r]ecent experience" in the form of lower court ATS
litigations, which drew objections from Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Papua
New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 75
The European countries that had been at the forefront of the universal
jurisdiction movement have since amended their statutes to limit the
doctrine's application, and it appears that the universal jurisdiction
complaints have decreased so that the doctrine is on the decline.76 On the
other hand, universal jurisdiction may be reinvigorated through European
cases against Syrians accused of torture and other crimes during that
country's brutal civil war. 77 Even if successful, however, such prosecutions
are likely to fuel, not quell, complaints that universal jurisdiction is applied
selectively.
3. Right to Democracy.-A third doctrinal change brought by human
rights was a purported right to democracy. This doctrine, too, was designed
to make inroads in the protections afforded to sovereigns by international
law. After a heyday in the immediate post-Cold War period, the purported

70. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court
and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (2013).
71. Id.
72. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 4,at 146--49, 153-54.
73. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 108 (2013).
74. Id. at 124.
75. Id. (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting)); see also Young, supra note 66,at 1042--43.
76. Cf Maximo Langer, Universal Jurisdiction Is Not Disappearing: The Shift from 'Global
Enforcer' to 'No Safe Haven' Universal Jurisdiction, 13 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 245, 248--49 (2015)
(arguing that the number of universal jurisdiction complaints has not substantially decreased in
recent years).
77. See Christian Wenaweser & James Cockayne, Justice for Syria?: The International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Emergence of the UN General Assembly in the
Realm of International CriminalJustice, 15 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 211,219 (2017); TRIAL INT'LET
AL., supra note 59.
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right to democracy was largely abandoned by the first decade of the new
century.
The breakup of the Soviet Union generated enthusiasm for democratic
governance around the world. 78 Election-monitoring institutions and
initiatives grew quickly in countries from Namibia to Nicaragua to Cambodia
and Bulgaria.79 The ouster of democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide
resulted in unprecedented condemnation by the Organization of American
States and the U.N. General Assembly, both of which suggested that
governmental authority is only legitimate to the extent it is a function of
popular sovereignty in the form of democracy. 80 A series of other events
unfolded over the decades that followed, including the restoration of Aristide
to power through the use of force authorized by the U.N. Security Council,81
which made clear a growing connection between political legitimacy and
democratic governance. The support of "democratic institutions" and
"democracy promotion"82 became an important mission of the United
Nations and other regional and international organizations. 83
A wave of scholarly enthusiasm for the emerging right to democratic
governance ensued, especially among U.S. scholars. 84 Based in part on
international and state practice, the right also found support in regional treaty
regimes, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which
affords individuals a right to vote), and Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 85 Article 21 protects the right of individuals to
participate in "periodic and genuine elections," which express the will of the
78. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46,46---47 (1992) [hereinafter Franck, The Emerging Right]; cf Reisman, supra note 13, at 86061; see also Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC
GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25,36-40 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000)
[hereinafter DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE] (chronicling an increase in democratic entitlement
through U.N. initiatives during the 1990s after the fall of communism). The events of the early
1990s augmented earlier efforts to ensure democratic governance. Id.
79. Franck, The Emerging Right, supra note 78, at 55, 70-74.
80. Id. at 47.
81. S.C. Res. 940, ,i,i 5, 17 (July 31, 1994).
82. Jean d'Aspremont, The Rise and Fall ofDemocracy Governance in International Law: A
Reply to Susan Marks, 22 EUR. J. INT'LL. 549,554,563 (2011) (citing,inter alia, Geoffrey Marston,
Guidelines on the Recognition ofNew States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 62 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 559, 559-60 (1991)) (describing the period from 1989 to 2010).
83. See Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?,
22 EUR. J. INT'LL. 507,516; Arnichai Magen, The Democratic Entitlement in an Era ofDemocratic
Recession, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 368,375-76 (2015).
84. E.g., Reisman, supra note 13; Magen, supra note 83, at 374-75; Fernando R. Tes6n, The
Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 60-74 (1992); see also B. BAUER,
DER VOLKERRECHTLICHE ANSPRUCH AUF DEMOKRATIE (1998).
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. For further discussion, see Franck, The
Emerging Right, supra note 78.
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people and further provides that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis
for the authority of government."86 Thus, states' legitimate claim to the
protections of "sovereignty" on the international level arguably became
dependent upon an internal democratic legal order.87 Understanding
legitimate sovereign authority as necessarily based upon a democratic order
led many to conclude that military and other intervention in foreign states is
not prohibited by international law when used to restore or create
democracy.88 The costs to international peace and security are clear. To be
sure, scholars offered prudential reasons for states to be cautious when using
"intrusive political, economic, and military measures" to "implement
democratization in a recalcitrant State," but such measures could "now be
included on the menu of lawful options."89
Today, however, international practice-and even academic
scholarship--has for some time retreated from the position that international
law requires states to have a "democratic origin."90 The retreat can be
attributed to several factors. Like universal jurisdiction and human rights
exceptions to immunity, a right to democracy caused interstate friction.
African nations protested the emphasis on democracy in the European
Union's trade and development policy.91 China's (and to some extent
Russia's) rise in power has also weakened the right to democracy, as China
has rejected any purported requirement of international law that it or other
states have a government that is democratic in origin. 92 More generally,
democracy is in a worldwide decline.93 Academics and other critics have
increasingly questioned the purported benefits of democratic governance,
especially the claim that it leads to peace, the protection of other human
rights, and economic prosperity. 94 Finally, the promotion of and purported

86. Universal Declaration, supra note 85.
87. Reisman, supra note 13, at 869-70. But see Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, International
Law and Democracy, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 373, 376---82 (2011).
88. Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, The Spread of Liberal Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC
GoVERNANCE, supra note 78, at 10-13. Some writers viewed the.right to democracy as part of a
right to internal self-determination. See Jean d' Aspremont, 1989-2010: The Rise and Fall of
Democratic Governance in International Law, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61,66 n.36 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds.,2012).
89. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 78, at 12. But see generally Michael Byers &
Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": Pro-Democratic Intervention in International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 78 (arguing that unilateral armed intervention to support
or restore democracy remains prohibited by international law).
90. See d'Aspremont, supra note 82, at 70; see also Thomas Carothers, The Backlash Against
Democracy Promotion, 85 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2006,at 55 (2006).
91. Paivi Leino, European Universalism?-The EU and Human Rights Conditionality, 24 Y.B.
EUR. L. 329, 338--40 (2005).
92. Seed' Aspremont, supra note 82, at 72.
93. See Magen, supra note 83,at 378-81.
94. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 83, at 519,523.
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right to democracy has been used selectively to advance other foreign policy
agendas of Western countries, especially the United States.95
4. Remedial Secession.-International human rights led to a fourth
purported doctrinal change in international law: the emergence of a right to
"remedial secession." Like the others, this doctrine experienced a surge in
academic enthusiasm in the 1990s based on some indicia of state practice.
Contemporary arguments about secession are closely linked to the "self
determination" of "peoples," a right protected by the U.N. Charter,96 by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,97 by the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,98 and by a variety of
other human rights instruments.99 That there is a right to self-determination
for peoples subjected to colonial rule is now well-settled. 100 The right to self
determination may also afford "peoples"-that is, groups united by some
combination ofrace, ethnicity, territorial affiliation, language, and religion
a right to political representation within their state. 101 If the state does not
afford peoples internal self-determination, the state is arguably not fully
sovereign, giving rise to a right of unilateral external secession or "remedial"
secession.102 As Ruti Teitel puts it, the "values of stability of statehood" that
had been "settled since the postwar period--entrenched in the UN Charter,
and so on-are now in play with other values, such as those of the protection

95. See id. at 521-23.
96. U.N. Charter art. 43, ,r 1.
97. ICCPR, supra note 85, art. 1.
98. ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 1.
99. U.N. Charter art. 1, ,r 2, art. 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1,
,r 1, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, art. 1, ,r 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter
Friendly Relations Declaration]; G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Declaration on
Granting ofIndependence].
100. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
. Respect ofKosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ,r 79 (July 22). A series ofICJ decisions
have addressed the right ofself-determination in the colonial context. See, e.g., Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
Rep. 136, ,r 88; East Timor (Port. v. Aust!.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ,r 29; Western Sahara,
Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 13, fl 54-59; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ,r,r 52-53.
101. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 85, art. 1; see also DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 237-43 (2002) (describing self-determination as including peoples' rights
to "participate in the . . . decision-making process" of the state).
102. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 357-400 (2004).
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of persons and peoples, e.g., self-determination as a remedy for
oppression."103
Teitel's argument is part of an important strand of philosophical work
on international law and its relationship to human rights. 104 The right to
remedial self-determination follows from the beginning premise that
sovereignty and international law are only legitimate to the extent they
represent and protect the individual; here, the individual's rights and well
being are reflected in a group-based or collective right to self-determination.
The difficulty with an international right to violent or "remedial"
secession is that it threatens to increase armed conflicts and war, and to
encourage the break-up of states into ever-smaller units. Descriptions of a
right to remedial secession implicitly recognize these dangers by limiting it
to situations in which peoples in question have suffered "extreme abuses" as
in Teitel's formulation of the argument. In one sense, it is difficult to see the
basis for such a limitation. To the extent that a state has inflicted "very bad"
(but not "extreme") human rights abuses, the state is not acting as a legitimate
sovereign, so that there is no sovereignty-based principle upon which to limit
peoples' right to violent secession. Yet the articulation of the right appears to
include a concern about the values that undergird a state-based system:
stability and limits on the use of force.
Philosophers have taken various approaches to this question. Some, for
example, defend a moral right to secession but limit it by what is feasible in
the international legal order. 105 Others, like Allan Buchanan, explicitly argue
that a legal right to secede is "inherently institutional" and can only be
defined with reference to its harmony "with the other main elements of a
morally defensible international legal system"-including those aspects of
the international legal order which discourage armed conflict. 106 Again, this
formulation of the right underscores the significance of the state-based
international legal order, even when a state is violating the human rights of
peoples within its territory.

103. TEITEL, supra note 13, at 194; see also Christian Walter & Antje von Ungem-Stemberg,
Introduction to SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6 (Christian
Walter et al. eds., 2014).
104. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 353; Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self
Determination, 105 ETHICS 352 (1995); see also Alan Patten, Democratic Secession from a
Multinational State, 112 ETHICS 55, 563-64 (2002).
105. BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 345-46 (noting the work of other scholars); see also Stefan
Oeter, The Role of Recognition and Non-Recognition with Regard to Secession, in SELF
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 45, 60 ("[R]emedial secession is a tool
for genuine cases of extreme emergency where the very survival of specific population groups is at
stake.").
106. BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 345-47.
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Turning to contemporary international law, it is widely (but not
universally) accepted that there is no "right" to remedial secession,107 despite
the push by many theorists and human rights activists, especially after the
Cold War ended.108 Secession is closely linked to recognition. Recognition is
the formal acknowledgement that a particular entity possesses the
qualifications for statehood or that a particular regime is the effective
government of a state.109 Recognition is generally followed by the
establishment of diplomatic relations, the possibility of acceptance into
international organizations, and other indicia of statehood. 110 Secessionist
movements have recognition as their goal because it is an essential bridge to
statehood.
International recognition practice shows there is a very strong norm
against unilateral secession in general.111 Indeed, states almost always refuse
to recognize secessionist groups as new states if their home states do not
recognize them, even if the secession enjoys long-term military success. 112
The norm against secession is so strong that even in the twenty-nine post
World War II cases-not limited to cases of remedial secession-in which a
secessionist movement opposed by its home state was able to both gain
control of territory and govern a population for at least two years, only three
(Bangladesh, Eritrea, and South Sudan) were fully successful, meaning that
their statehood was eventually recognized by their home state. An additional
three (Kosovo, Taiwan, and Palestine) have been recognized by more than
ten members of the United Nations, but not by the state from which they seek
to secede; none are members of the United Nations. The remaining twenty-

107. See, e.g., Walter & von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 103, at 3; Christopher J. Borgen,
Law, Rhetoric, Strategy: Russia and Self-Determination Before and After Crimea, 91 INT'L L.
STUD. 216, 229-34 (2015); Jure Vidmar,International Legal Responses to Kosovo's Declaration
of Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 779,816(2009); cf MILENA STERIO,THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION UNDERINTERNATIONALLAW 134(2013)("[A]n argument can be advanced
that international law tolerates a limited right of secession for peoples whose rights to internal self
determination have been egregiously disrespected.").
108. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Frankel,International Law of Secession: New Rules for a New Era,
14 Rous. J. INT'L L. 521, 526 (1992); see also BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 397-98
(acknowledging that the right to secession .he defended in 2004 was narrower than the one he
defended in 1991; the later work reflects a greater appreciation of the limited institutional capacities
of international law).
109. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 203 cmt.
a(AM.LAWINST.1986).
110. See MIKULAS FABRY, RECOGNIZING STATES: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW STATES SINCE 1776,at 7 (2010).
111. Id. at 165--66, 179; see also Tanisha M.Fazal & Ryan D. Griffiths, Membership Has Its
Privileges: The Changing Benefits of Statehood, 16 INT'L STUD. REV.76,97(2014); Borgen,supra
note 107,at 229.
112. See JAMES CRAWFORD,THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 415-18(2d
ed.2006); FABRY, supra note 110, at 13.
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three "states" have been recognized by fewer than ten other states, or were
reabsorbed into their home states.113
Some of both the successful and the unsuccessful states involved claims
of remedial secession, but there is widespread disagreement as to which
situations present legitimate claims to remedial secession and which do not.
Even in the cases that arguably provide the strongest support for remedial
secession-Kosovo and South Sudan-the basis for secession is not clear
and success in terms of recognition is best explained by power politics.11 4
And although claims of human rights abuses directed at the group that seeks
secession might improve their political arguments for recognition,
international law does not require other states to accord recognition on this
(or any other) basis.115
Despite the claim that human rights have displaced or transformed
sovereignty as the basis of the international legal order and the arguments for
a legal right to remedial secession which flows from that claim, international
law and practice have not followed.
5. Humanitarian Intervention & Responsibility to Protect. -The claim
that international human rights have transformed state sovereignty led to an
explicit call for the use of force by the international community to prevent
widespread human rights violations. This fifth doctrinal change goes under
the heading of "humanitarian intervention" or (with somewhat different
content) the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). Both are explicitly premised
on a reorientation of sovereignty in favor of human rights couched as either
the right of other states to intervene or as the responsibility of sovereigns to
protect individual rights. Both have been diminished by the unsuccessful R2P

113. Kristy Buzard et al., Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self-Determination and Foreign
Influence, 33 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 578, 582 (2017). Palestine and Taiwan arguably do not involve
secession at all. See Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Recognition ofPalestinian Statehood:
A Clarification of the Interests of the Concerned Parties, 40 GA. J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 341, 377
(2012); CRAWFORD, supra note 112, at 206-21, 434.
114. See Milena Sterio, Secession: A Proposalfor a New Legal Framework, GERM. Y.B. INT'L
L. (forthcoming 2017) (describing uncertainty around remedial secession in the cases of Kosovo
and Nagomo-Karabakh); Oeter, supra note 105, at 59-60 (arguing that Kosovo did not meet the
criteria for remedial secession); STERIO, supra note 107, at 136 (arguing that Chechnya had a better
claim to remedial secession than Kosovo); id. at 151-52 (arguing that claims by South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to remedial secession were comparable to those of Kosovo); id. at 167 (arguing that South
Sudan's claim for remedial secession is problematic and that the legally stronger argument would
rest on a claim of delayed decolonization). With respect to Eritrea, see Gregory Fox, Eritrea, in
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION, supra note 103, at 288-89, who argues that there are
several legal bases for Eritrea's secession, including remedial secession, but the question of whether
"the level of Ethiopian oppression was sufficiently egregious to trigger the right" to remedial
secession is impossible to answer.
115. Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6
ST. ANTONY'S INT'L REV., May 2010, at 37, 51.
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intervention in Libya and subsequent failure of the international community
to respond effectively to the crisis in Syria.
The global failure to prevent war in Bosnia during the collapse of
Yugoslavia and to prevent a horrific genocide in Rwanda during the 1990s
led practitioners and scholars to look for new ways to improve the
international response to such atrocities.116 Then during the spring of 1999,
human rights abuses escalated in the Serbian province ofKosovo.117 Haunted
by the events in Bosnia and in Rwanda, many state officials believed that it
was morally unconscionable to watch the human rights situation deteriorate
in Kosovo without responding.U 8 The U.N. Security Council was unable to
act because Russia, with its permanent member's veto, was a longtime ally
of Serbia.119 Russia argued that the unrest in Kosovo was a domestic issue,
not one that justified international intervention.120 These events led to an
extensive debate about the wisdom and the legality of humanitarian
intervention that lacked either the U.N. Security Council authorization or the
consent of the territorial state.121
In the end, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Serbia, which
NATO described partly in humanitarian terms. Some scholars have defended
humanitarian intervention on the grounds that the protection and enforcement
of human rights is "the ultimate justification of the existence of states."122
States that violate human rights are accordingly not protected by sovereignty
from external military intervention.123
116. Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 247, 251-54 (2014).
117. See Mark Weisburd, International Law and the Problem ofEvil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 225, 231-33 (2001) for a discussion of the factual background.
118. See Law, Morality and the Use of Force, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG.,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_l 8418.htm?selectedLocale=en#top
(https://perma.cc/NQ42-VYAQ]; Press Release, Security Council, NATO Action Against Serbian
Military Targets Prompts Divergent Views as Security Council Holds Urgent Meeting on Situation
in Kosovo, U.N. Press Release SC/6657 (Mar. 24, 1999).
119. See Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n.7
(2000).
120. Why Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo, BBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 1998),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/l l 1585.stm (https://perma.cc/SMN3-96XJ]; see also Vladimir
Putin, President of Russ., Address (Mar. 18, 2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/20603 [https://perma.cc/9R33-SXXC] (comparing the Crimea dispute to Kosovo and arguing
that violations of domestic legislation are not equivalent to a violation of international law).
121. See Adam Roberts, The So-Called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 3 (2000); Simon Chesterman, Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian
Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule ofLaw, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 293, 294 (2002).
122. FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 16 (3d ed. 2005).
123. See Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality ofHumanitarian Intervention: Lessonsfrom
Kosovo, 5 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1743, 1764 (2000) ("[W]hen another state intervenes to protect
human rights . . . it is not violating a principle of sovereignty. Rather, it is liberating a principle of
sovereignty."); Koh, supra note 13, at 288 (arguing in favor of humanitarian intervention in part
because international law should serve human purposes, including human rights); Kimberley N.
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The Kosovo intervention had major ramifications. After the bombing
campaign, the United Nations authorized a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
With the strong support of Western European countries and the United States,
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. 124 Serbia and its
allies, especially Russia, strongly condemned the declaration of
independence and continue today to refuse to recognize Kosovo. 125 Russian
officials in turn used the Kosovo precedent to support Russia's use of force
in both Georgia and Ukraine. 126 Crimea, which was part of Ukraine, is today
Russian. Russian justification for its actions against Georgia and Ukraine
made repeated and clear references to precedent set by NATO in Kosovo.
The events in Kosovo were not just directly destabilizing in terms of
international peace and security, but they also led to the formation of an
independent commission (the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty or ICISS), which published a report entitled "The
Responsibility to Protect." 127 The United States and NATO had not explicitly
defended the Kosovo intervention as consistent with international law,
although the United Kingdom and Belgium did make an explicitly legal
argument in favor of "humanitarian intervention." 128 The ICISS report made
a comprehensive defense of R2P, built on (but slightly different from)
humanitarian intervention.
The ICISS Report declared that states have a responsibility to protect
not only their own citizens, but also those of foreign countries, from massive
human rights violations. 129 It lists as one of the foundations of R2P the
"specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection
declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and

Trapp, Unauthorized Military Interventions for the Public Good: A Response to Harold Koh, AJIL
UNBOUND, Oct. 2017, at 292, 292-93 (arguing that state sovereignty should not "shield a state so
as to provide it with the (legal and physical) space within which to violate individual rights to life
and physical integrity'').
124. See James Summers, Kosovo, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 103, at 236-44.
125. Id. at 235.
126. For Russia's position in the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, see id. at 23536 (citing Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ORG. SECURITY
CO-OPERATION EUR. (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.osce.org/pc/33l66?download=true [https://
perma.cc/UG8D-W5XV]); for Russia's reference to Kosovo in supporting Ukraine's secession, see
David Herszenhom, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/crimea-ukraine
secession-vote-referendum.html [https://perma.cc/8V38-ACBB].
127. GARETH J. EVANS ET AL., THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001) [hereinafter
ICISS REPORT].
128. Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 Hous. L. REV.
971, 977-80 (2016).
129. ICISS REPORT, supra note 127, at 5, 81.
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national law."130 Unlike humanitarian intervention, R2P focuses on the
responsibility of sovereigns rather than their rights. 131 Like humanitarian
intervention, however, the ICISS report supported the unilateral use of force
by states to prevent widespread human rights atrocities if the U.N. Security
Council is unable to act.132 The U.N. Secretary General subsequently
endorsed R2P, but U.N. Member States did not accept that there was either a
right or a duty to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises without the
approval of the U.N. Security Council.133
The R2P principle initially appeared to receive a major boost from the
2011 Libya intervention. The U.N. Security Council authorized the use of
force in Libya134 in part because the Libyan government "forfeited" its
"responsibility to protect Libyan citizens, implicitly inviting the United
Nations to act"135 for humanitarian purposes, namely to protect the
population from grave human rights violations.136 Libya was the first time
that the Security Council approved the use of force as an application of the
R2P doctrine.137 By all assessments, the Libya intervention started out well.
As President Obama put it: "So we actually executed this plan as well as I
could have expected: We got a UN mandate, we built a coalition, it cost us
$1 billion-which, when it comes to military operations, is very cheap. We
averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what almost surely
would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict." 138
But today, Libya, a "key test of [the R2P] principle,"139 is widely
recognized as a failure. First, Libya itself is now in effect a failing state, with
no central government, warring factions, and mounting civilian casualties.140
It is not at all clear that the Libyan intervention improved the lives or the

130. Id. at xi.
131. Id. at 16--17.
132. Id. at 54-55.
133. G.A. Res. 60/1, ,r 30, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 2005) (accepting state
responsibility to "protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity," which entails the prevention of such crimes "through appropriate and necessary
means").
134. See S.C. Res. 1973, ,r 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing member states to "take all necessary
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas" in Libya).
135. See Koh, supra note 128, at 982.
136. President Obama explained the U.S. action in Libya in terms of human rights. President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011).
137. MICHAEL M. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: JOHN STUART MILL AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 127-28 (2015).
138. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ [https ://perma.cc/
5ZJB-52EG].
139. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, Libya, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 699, 700 (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al. eds., 2016).
140. Alan J. Kuperman, Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in
Failure, 94 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2015, at 66, 66--72.
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human rights protection of Libyans in the medium-term.141 Second, Libya
has become a haven for terrorists and ISIS, a situation that has forced the
United States to use airstrikes within Libya.142 In that sense, the intervention
has led to greater regional unrest, as the ISIS terrorists in Libya threaten other
countries.143 Third, the Libyan intervention launched a contentious debate
about the selective use of force and about regime change as an aspect of
R2P.144 Past support of the Gadhafi regime by Western countries despite the
regime's dismal record on human rights, along with other factors, led to
questions about political and economic motives for the intervention. 145
Finally, the application of the R2P doctrine in Libya appears to be partly
responsible for the decisions by Russia and China to block any U.N. Security
Council resolution on the use of force for humanitarian purposes in Syria.146
Syrian protestors and rebels waited for the U.N. Security Council to authorize
the use of force-and to save them and their country-but that support never
came.147 The tragic humanitarian crisis and horrific violations of international
law in Syria have undercut the R2P doctrine. 148
More recently, however, in April, 2017, President Trump launched
missile strikes in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons, which drew
141. President Obama calls Libya a "mess," but Jeffrey Goldberg writes that, "Mess is the
president's diplomatic term; privately, he calls Libya a 'shit show."' Goldberg, supra note 138; see
also Seamus Milne, If the Libyan War Was About Saving Lives, It Was a Catastrophic Failure,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/201 l /oct/26/libya-war
saving-lives-catastrophic-failure [https://perma.cc/F3BJ-TM3S] (discussing the increase in "mass
abduction and detention, beating and routine torture, killings and atrocities," and civilian
"massacres" that have occurred after the Libya intervention).
142. See Goldberg, supra note 138 ("[Libya has] subsequently become an ISIS haven---one
that [the United States] has already targeted with air strikes.").
143. Id.; see also Kuperman, supra note 140, at 72 (arguing that "[a]nother unintended
consequence of the Libya intervention has been to amplify the threat of terrorism from [Libya] and
surrounding countries").
144. See, e.g., Amy Baker Benjamin, To Wreck a State: The New International Crime, 19 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 208, 223 (2016) (proposing a new crime in international law that prevents states from
using humanitarian concern as a pretext for invading or attacking another state).
145. See id. at 230-31 (arguing that potential motivations for Libyan regime change include
gaining control of Libya's oil, protecting the status of the French Franc and French influence in
Africa, and providing a boost to international banks by destroying Libya's civilian infrastructure).
146. See Salman Shaikh & Amanda Roberts, Syria, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
21ST CENTURY, supra note 139, at 717, 719; Koh, supra note 128, at 998; Russia and China Veto
UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/20 l l/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution [https://perma.cc/JQV8-8EDY].
147. Ian Black & Peter Walker, Syrian Protestors Demand Action to Halt Killings by Bashar
al-Assad Regime, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/
01/syria-demands-action-assad-killings [https ://perma.cnN32V-TNHR].
148. See Tom Esslemont, As Syrian Deaths Mount, World's "Responsibility to Protect" Takes
a Hit: Experts, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rnideast-crisis-syria
law/as-syrian-deaths-mount-worlds-responsibility-to-protect-takes-a-hit-experts
idUSKCN1202S3 [https://perma.cc/NXA2-S3UC] (discussing the limited success of R2P, which
is described as a "high moral aspiration" that has "floundered" on the complex realities of warfare
today, especially in the Syrian conflict).
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significant support from other states-in the form of both explicit approval
and lack of condemnation.149 Most important, perhaps, was China's decision
not to condemn the strikes as a violation of international law.150 These events
provide some support for R2P, although the U.S. government has not
defended its actions in those terms. Russia's condemnation of the strikes
illustrate the difficulties of implementing R2P to the mutual satisfaction of
countries with different strategic objectives. 151
6. Conclusion.-Before leaving the five doctrinal innovations analyzed
in this section, let us consider two overarching counterarguments. First, these
five doctrines are not at the core of international human rights. In one sense
this counterargument is correct. The core substantive human rights
commitments that are made by and/or are binding upon states are set out in
treaty instruments and in customary international law, not in the doctrines
addressed in this section, which generally go to enforcement. Even if the five
doctrines are of declining significance, they could be abandoned without
changing substantive international human rights obligations. Enforcement is
nevertheless, however, a core issue of international human rights law. In a
sense, enforcement is the key challenge of international human rights law; if
methods of enforcement are stripped away, then the promise of international
human rights law has gone unfulfilled. As well, these doctrinal innovations
are not "merely" about enforcement. Taken together, they are important
components of the claim that sovereignty and international law have been
reframed to have individual human rights and welfare at their core. 152 To
abandon these doctrinal innovations is to gut much of the core of the
purported transformation of sovereignty and international law, although other
aspects of that transformation, including international criminal law, are not
addressed here.
A second counterargument is that the international peace and security
costs associated with these doctrinal innovations have not actually been so
great, with the possible exceptions of humanitarian intervention, unilateral

149. See Madison Park, Who's with the US on Syria Strike and Who Jsn 't, CNN (Apr. 9, 2017),
[https://
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/07/world/syria-us-strike-world-reaction/index.html
perma.cc/4ZVL-6NX8].
150. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on
April 7, 2017, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
rnfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/tl 452149.shtml
[https://perrna.cc/7VE3HRZH].
151. Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, April 12, 2017,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. Russ. (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign
_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/27255 73#9 [https://perma.cc/LT7M
S5V6].
152. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 13, at 8-11; William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International
Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational
Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 183 (2000); Peters, supra note 13, at 514.
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secession in Kosovo, and the use of R2P in Libya. Moreover, even if states
say that a particular doctrine undermines peace and security, that statement
may be insincere and may instead mask a self-serving preference not to
enforce human rights through international law.
Even assuming that these objections are correct, the descriptive point
remains: the limited (and apparently dwindling) state support for these
doctrines suggests the purported transformation of international law around
human rights is on questionable footing. As well, to the extent that the costs
of the doctrines have been low, that may be because these enforcement
measures have been used so infrequently. Like the low levels of funding for
the U.N. treaty bodies, discussed below, these doctrines have either been too
costly or not nearly costly enough. If states were serious about a reorientation
of international law around human rights, the foregoing doctrines would be
employed far more often, reducing the problem of selective enforcement, but
with potentially far higher costs.
B.

Costs to the "Territorial Peace"
Political scientists provide another way to consider the costs of the
human rights-related doctrinal innovations in international law. Empirical
scholarship has linked peace with an absence of territorial conflict: a
"territorial peace." Some of the doctrines described above undermine the
ways in which international law tends to generate territorial security.
The occurrence of interstate war and overall mortality in war sharply
decreased after 1815 and again after 1945. 153 Scholars do not fully agree on
the reason for this decline, but the empirical evidence suggests that a decline
in armed disputes may be caused by the "democratic peace" or the "territorial
peace." The first, discussed in greater detail in Part III, posits that
democracies are less likely to have conflicts with each other than they are
with nondemocracies. 154 The second posits that war has declined because
there has been a reduction in conflict over territory. 155 The democratic peace

153. Azar Gat, Is War Declining-and Why?, 50 J. PEACE RES. 149, 152 (2012); see also
STEVEN PINKER, THE BEITER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 249-50
(2011) (describing the many categories of war which have not happened since 1945, including wars
with nuclear weapons, battlefield combat between superpowers, and interstate wars between major
developed countries).
154. DAVID SOBEK, THE CAUSES OF WAR 84-85 (2009); Johann Park & Patrick James,
Democracy, Territory, and Armed Conflict, 1919-1995, 11 FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 85, 86
(2015). The democratic peace is sometimes attributed to the structural aspects of democracy such
as elections, which allow voters to punish the leaders and the political parties that take a country
into war. See David Lektzian & Mark Souva, A Comparative Theory Test of Democratic Peace
Arguments, 1946-2000, 46 J. PEACE RES. 17, 32 (2009).
155. For a literature review of territorial peace theory, see John A. Vasquez & Emily E. Barrett,
Peace as the Absence ofMilitarized Conflict: Comparing the Democratic and Territorial Peace, 2
J. TERRITORIAL & MAR. Sruo., Winter/Spring 2015, at 5-8.

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:279

literature is long-standing and well-established; territory is the "rising star"
among explanations of the interstate-conflict processes.156
Numerous empirical studies show that territorial disputes are a leading
cause of war and that their absence is a significant predictor of peace. Since
1815, territorial disputes have had a higher probability of leading to war than
any other kind of dispute.157 Moreover, for wars between 1816-1997,
territorial wars were the most prevalent form of war.158 Another study of wars
from 1648 through 2007 concluded that "[t]erritory has consistently
constituted the issue over which states have most frequently gone to war, and
this is true by a wide margin."159 States able to resolve their territorial
disputes160 thus eliminate a significant cause of war. Territorial disputes in
relationships between states dropped dramatically after 1945, providing one
explanation for the decrease in interstate wars.161 Additional studies have also
concluded that the absence of territorial claims is associated with fewer
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), a measure that includes war, as well
as military displays and threats of war.162 The effect of territorial disputes on
war and peace is felt in an additional way: eliminating territorial conflict
apparently not only eliminates a war-generating issue, but it may also reduce
hostility around other issues.163 The association between the absence of
territorial claims and peace is referred to as the "territorial peace."164
Why ar.e territorial disputes apparently so detrimental to peace? Perhaps
removing territorial disputes allows states to shrink their militaries, reducing
the perception that they are threatening.165 Another possibility: researchers
posit that Mills are more likely to result from territorial claims that are
imbued with intangible values like ethnic worth than they are from territorial
claims without intangible values.166 Perhaps settling territorial claims with
high intangible values has more "spill-over" effect than the settlement of
156. Park & James, supra note 154, at 86.
157. Vasquez & Barrett, supra note 155, at 6 (citing multiple studies, e.g., JOHN A. VASQUEZ,
THEWAR PUZZLE (1993) and Paul R. Hensel, Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and
Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992, 15 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI., at 43-73 (1996)).
158. See John A. Vasquez & Brandon Valeriano, Classification ofInterstate Wars, 72 J. POL.
292, 300 (2010).
159. GARY GoERTZ ET AL., THE PUZZLE OF PEACE: THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 89 (2016).
160. For a discussion of what counts as a "territorial dispute," see id. at 79-80. Although studies
vary some in how they define that term, it generally does not include peaceful boundary
management or maritime disputes (unless they are accompanied by dispute over land). Id. at 80.
161. Id. at 93 tbl.4.4.
162. See id. at 91-92 (analyzing Mills and showing that "the raw frequency of territorial
disputes, as well as their percentage relative to other issues[,] . . . has declined in the post-World
War II era").
163. Vasquez & Barrett, supra note 155, at 6.
164. GOERTZ ET AL., supra note 159, at 82.
165. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
166. Vasquez & Barrett, supra note 155, at 9.
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other kinds of claims because they tend to be especially inflammatory,
making all other issues more intractable.
Whatever the reasons, the foregoing analysis has important implications
for international law. Legal rules and institutions that reduce conflict over
territory appear likely to reduce military conflicts. And they are likely to do
so with greater positive effect than legal rules and institutions that reduce
political or economic disagreements between states. International legal rules
designed to reduce conflict over territory and borders include: Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter and other international legal rules that prohibit the use of
force to acquire territory; the doctrine of uti possidetis, which provides that
newly formed states keep the territorial borders they had before
decolonization or their previous internal borders; and the lack of a right to
violent secession.
Not only are these legal rules partially designed to reduce territorial
conflict, but we now also have a body of empirical evidence that suggests
they have been successful. Territorial conquests, for example, declined
during the twentieth century as the international rule limiting the use of force
hardened. 167 The conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 arguably
precipitated the decline in conquests; 168 in any event, prohibition on the use
of force for territorial conquest was strengthened in the U.N. Charter and
became a cornerstone of the post-World War II international legal order. 169
Second, the uti possidetis norm appears to have reduced territorial conflict. 170
Third, violent secessions have decreased during the twentieth century.171
The reorientation of the international legal system toward individual
human rights and away from state sovereignty threatens to undermine all
three of these doctrines. The focus on human rights may also threaten to
undermine the ability of the U.N. Security Council to resolve territorial
disputes peaceably. As described above, humanitarian intervention,
Responsibility to Protect, a right to democracy, and a right to violent
secession all weaken Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The uti possidetis
doctrine is challenged to the extent it violates the rights of people who are
rendered a potentially oppressed minority in the new state. 172 The "territorial
167. See TANISHA M. FAZAL, STATE DEATH: THE POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHY OF CONQUEST,
OCCUPATION, AND ANNEXATION 169-228 (2007); GoERTZ ET AL., supra note 159, at 112-17;
Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use ofForce,
55 INT'LORG. 215 (2001).
168. OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: How A RADICAL PLAN
TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 309-35 (2017).
169. U.N. Charter art. 2, ,r 4.
170. David B. Carter & H. E. Goemans, The Making ofthe Territorial Order: New Borders and
the Emergence ofInterstate Conflict, 65 INT'L ORO. 275, 275-76 (2011).
171. GOERTZ ET AL., supra note 159, at 126-28.
172. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Border ofNew
States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 612 (1996). Uti possidetis is also challenged as potentially increasing
the number of territorial disputes (rather than reducing them) because it may lead groups of people

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:279

peace" literature suggests that to the extent human rights-related doctrines
render borders less secure and the ownership of territory less certain, there
may be significant costs to international peace and security.
Using military force in the humanitarian intervention and R2P contexts,
or to install democracy or effectuate violent secession, is not the same as
using force for territorial acquisition. Arguably, using force in these human
rights-promoting contexts does not destabilize borders, even if the use of
force for territorial acquisition does lead to conflict about borders. But our
actual experience with recent uses of force does not bear out this argument.
Consider Kosovo-one of the key examples in the arguments that
sovereignty and international law have been reconceptualized. 173 Although
the intervention violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the use of force by
NATO was not intended as territorial acquisition. Its purpose was, instead, to
prevent mass atrocities and human rights violations. 174 Nor was territorial
acquisition the direct effect of the intervention: NATO countries did not
claim the territory of Kosovo for themselves.
The intervention and subsequent secession by Kosovo from Serbia did
nonetheless destabilize borders. The precedent set by the Western states with
respect to Kosovo, which later seceded from Serbia and became a Western
ally, became the legal basis for Russia's intervention in Georgia and in
Crimea, Ukraine, ostensibly at the request of newly seceded regimes. The
newly contested border between Ukraine and Russia has, in turn, generated
broader tensions between Russia, the United States, and NAT0. 175 The
empirical data tells us that this is the kind of conflict-about borders and
territory-most likely to escalate into a militarized dispute.

unhappy with the borders to make territorial claims, perhaps through the use of force. Empirical
work does not appear to support this argument. See Carter & Goemans, supra note 170, at 304.
173. As another example, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, designed in part to remedy human rights
violations and to promote democracy, has arguably failed to do either and has also destabilized the
Iraqi border with Turkey and with the quasi- or pseudo-states of ISIS and Kurdistan. See Metin
Gurcan, Turkey Sticks Its Neck Out Again, This Time in Iraq, AL-MONITOR (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.al-monitor.corn/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-iraq-becomes-third-largest-army.html
[https://perma.cc/TAY3-W25L].
174. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], The Situation in and Around
Kosovo, Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,
NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (99)51, ,r 2 (Apr. 12, 1999) ("[NATO] condemns these
appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of force by the Yugoslav
government. These extreme and criminally irresponsible polices . . . have made necessary and
justify the military action by NATO.").
175. Bruce Blair, Could US-Russia Tensions Go Nuclear?, PoLmco (Nov. 17, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/W6M4http://www.politico.eu/article/could-u-s-russia-tensions-go-nuclear/
R5EA]; Jeremy Diamond & Greg Botelho, US-Russia Military Tit for Tat Raises Fears of Greater
Conflict, CNN (June 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/l 7/politics/russia-us-military-threats
rise-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/M2SX-C5MG]; Relations with Russia, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORO. (June 16, 2017), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htrn# [https://perma.cc/
CH75-NJ3T].
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Note that there are many potential reasons for the decrease in armed
conflict in the post-World War II period and before, many of which are not
closely tied to international law. 176 Nevertheless, the strength of the
association between territorial disputes and war in the empirical literature
suggests that if international law can reduce---or contribute to a reduction
in--conflict over territory, it will contribute to a reduction in armed conflict,
whatever the mixture of factors which may have contributed to peace
historically or which may do so in the future.
C.

The United Nations and Polarization Costs

The United Nations, too, has been changed by human rights in ways that
appear to impose costs on international cooperation and international law.
The United Nations and the treaty that created it, the U.N. Charter, are the
cornerstones of the post-World War II international order.177 Developments
in the United Nations over the past several decades appear in some respects
to parallel the developments in the doctrinal enforcement mechanisms
discussed above: the enforcement of international human rights law through
the United Nations is widely perceived as ineffective and selective, leading
to polarization and a lack of credibility that may hamper the overall work of
the United Nations. The trajectory is a bit different, however. The U.N.
human rights bodies did not experience the same tum-of-the-century heyday,
although there was a spurt of optimism around the reform of the Human
Rights Council in 2006. Here, the story is mostly one of stasis. It is also
important to note again that measuring the effectiveness of international
human rights law and institutions is generally difficult and contested.
The purposes of the United Nations are "[t]o maintain international
peace and security," and "[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms ...." 178 This choice of language subordinates the
promotion and encouragement ofrespect for human rights to the achievement
of international cooperation and to the maintenance of peace and security, 179
a choice underscored by the placement of the responsibility for human rights
with the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.(ECOSOC), an "organ in

176. See. e.g., Gat, supra note 153, at 2-8 (discussing many possibilities such as economic
growth, commmercial interdependence, social attitude changes, and nuclear deterrence); Pinker,
supra note 153, at 189-288 (discussing many possibilities including the value placed on human life,
nuclear weapons, democracy, and international organizations).
177. ICISS REPORT, supra note 127, at 52.
178. U.N. Charter art. 1, ml 1, 3.
179. Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical
View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 336-37 (1995).
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decline almost from the start." 180 The language also does not necessarily
mean human rights are or should be protected by or as international law.
Indeed, contemporary observers understood that the Charter envisioned
"voluntary cooperation" on human rights as coordinated and facilitated by
the General Assembly and the ECOSOC. 181 Human rights are protected by
domestic law and constitutions, regional organizations, and moral or
religious beliefs and values. In all of these forms, human rights can be
"promoted" and "encouraged" through international cooperation and
international institutions without international legal protection.
When the U.N. Charter was drafted and adopted, few-if any-human
rights were protected by international law, so it is largely in this broader sense
that the purposes of the United Nations include the promotion and
encouragement of respect for human rights. The United Nations itself was
intended, at least by the Allied leaders who planned and created it, as a
security framework that would balance great powers against one another and
thereby promote international peace and security as well as ensure the
sovereign equality of all nations. 182
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that the United Nations' track record in
some aspects of protecting human rights has been poor. Although the United
Nations served as the institutional forum for the negotiation and conclusion
of many multilateral human rights agreements, 183 the mechanisms of
international legal enforcement of human rights have not been a clear success
for human rights themselves. Moreover, efforts by the United Nations to
enforce human rights, especially international human rights law, appear to
have detracted from international cooperation as a whole by contributing to
the organization's loss of credibility, as discussed in subpart II(C), and by
contributing to polarization, as discussed below.
1. Human Rights Council.-The unfortunate failure of the Human
Rights Commission, its dismantling by the United Nations in 2006, and its
reincarnation as the Human Rights Counci1184 illustrate some of the
difficulties of the U.N.'s efforts to enforce human rights through international
180. Daphna Shraga, The Security Council and Human Rights-from Discretion to Promote to
Obligation to Protect, in SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACIIIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 8, 9-10 (Bardo Fassbender ed., 2011).
181. Bardo Fassbender, Introduction to SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
CHALLENGES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 180, at 1, 2.
182. Koskenniemi, supra note 179, at 335; see also C. L. Lim, The Great Power Balance, the
United Nations and What the Framers Intended: In Partial Response to Hans Kochler, 6 CHINESE
J. INT'L L. 307, 309-14 (2007).
183. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).
184. G.A. Res. 60/251, ,r 1 (Mar. 15, 2006).
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law. The Human Rights Commission was created in 1946. 185 Its loss of
legitimacy and the reasons it was shuttered are generally summarized in these
terms:
The Commission was notoriously impotent, farcical even. Countries
with egregious human rights records, from Libya to Sudan, managed
to become Commission members, affording them a platform to deflect
criticism, obstruct meaningful action against flagrant atrocities, and,
to the chagrin of the United States, disproportionately bash Israel. The
Commission's work often pitted the West against non-Western
countries, which tended to vote in blocs along the lines of the
Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). By the time it was shuttered in 2006, the
Commission was discredited and disgraced. 186
Early reports on the Council suggest that its work is also dominated by
regional and political bloc voting, including a disproportionate focus on
Israel. As Professor Rosa Freedman describes:
Despite warnings about selectivity, bias, double standards, and loss of
credibility, from the outset Council discussions were dominated by
states seeking to vilify Israel and to keep the spotlight on that region.
A large number of OIC states were able to express, and use their votes
to achieve, collective positions. The OIC sought to retain focus on the
OPT as part of national and regional foreign policies including
political, religious, cultural, and regional ties with the Palestinians and
with affected neighbouring states. OIC states also used the situation to
divert attention away from other gross and systemic violations within
the Middle East or within influential OIC Council members such as
Pakistan, Algeria, and Egypt. 187
As a result, the Human Rights Council, like the Human Rights
Commission before it, is of questionable value, despite its new tools such as
Universal Periodic Review, which requires all states to appear before the
Council to report on human rights in their country. 188 To be sure, it is possible

185. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
[https://
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/CommissionOnHumanRights.aspx
perma.cc/F2NR-N74U].
186. Daniel Chardell, Gaining Ground at the UN Human Rights Council, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 3, 2014), http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/10/03/gaining-ground-at-the-un
human-rights-council/ [https://perma.cc/K.88C-U4CH].
187. Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: More ofthe Same?, 31 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 208, 226 (2013) [hereinafter Freedman, More ofthe Same?]; see also SUBEDI, supra note
14 at 129-39.
188. Vincent Chetail, The Human Rights Council and the Challenges of the United Nations
System on Human Rights: Towards a Cultural Revolution?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
QUEST FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION 222-23 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo Kohen
eds., 2010).
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that the Council's work is improving,189 or that it has a positive overall impact
on human rights in indirect ways, for example by increasing the effectiveness
of other enforcement mechanisms such as domestic courts and regional
courts and tribunals. Both points highlight the difficulty in measuring human
rights outcomes and underscore the need for caution in proposing solutions.
The questionable efficacy ofthe U.N.'s human rights work does mean,
however, that at a minimum we should take seriously the potential costs of
that work to the other objectives of the United Nations. The Human Rights
Commission and Council may have had a negative effect on the work ofthe
United Nations as a whole. First, as human rights have become more central
to the work of the United Nations, the failures of the Commission and
Council may become more closely tied to the success--or not--ofthe entire
institution.190 These "credibility costs" are discussed below in subpart Il(C).
Second, divisions within the Human Rights Commission and Council, as well
as human rights issues generally, appear to contribute to regional and political
divisions among states, which hinder the work ofthe General Assembly and
the Security Council on a wide variety ofissues. These divisions are referred
to in this Article as "polarization."191
The work of the U.N. General Assembly is, according to many
observers, undercut by polarization.192 The Cold War politics within the
General Assembly-which often prevented it from acting constructively
illustrate the point historically.193 Even in the period after 1990, U.N. General
Assembly voting has been dominated by a divide between the West and non
Western countries. Indeed, in the years 1990-2011, "[m]ore than 90 percent
of every single vote casted ('yes' or 'no') can be classified correctly by the
placement ofstates on one single dimension": the West and the rest.194
189. See Alston, supra note 9 (noting that "the Human Rights Council has been 'operating in a
way that is surprisingly balanced in the last few years, especially if the issue of Israel and the
occupied Palestinian territories is put to one side,"' but also noting that China, Russia, and growing
populism are likely to change this dynamic).
190. See The Shame of the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/opinion/the-shame-of-the-united-nations.html
[https://perma.cc/
8HUS-ZEB6]; George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address at the UN High-Level Plenary
Meeting (Sept. 14, 2005) (transcript available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/53 l l l .htJn
[https://perma.cc/N8JZ-645V]).
191. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1349
(2016) (defining "polarization" in terms of group political cohesion and bloc voting). A related
problem is that of"politicization," sometimes defined as deliberation or decision-making based on
political objectives unrelated to the issue being debated or decided. See Freedman, More of the
Same?, supra note 187, at 210--11 for a discussion of politicization in the human rights context.
192. See, e.g., LINDA FASULO, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE UN 88-90 (3d ed. 2015).
193. See Frederick H. Gareau, Cold-War Cleavages as Seen.from the United Nations General
Assembly: 1947-1967, 32 J. POL. 929, 931-32 (1970); Amy L. Sayward, International Institutions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE COLD WAR 384-85 (Richard H. lnunerman & Petra Goedde
eds., 2013).
194. Nicolas Burmester & Michael Jankowski, Comparing Regional Organizations in the
United Nations General Assembly-Is There a Shift to Regionalism? 13 .(Mar. 26, 2014)
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General Assembly votes on human rights resolutions have had a
significant role in generating the polarization found in General Assembly
voting patterns. One analysis finds, for example, that human rights
resolutions within the General Assembly have a very high "discrimination
parameter," meaning they "weigh heavily" in the conflict between liberal and
nonliberal states. 19 5 That study showed human rights votes with a higher
discrimination parameter than colonialism, economic issues, disarmament,
Middle East, and nuclear issues. 196 To be clear, this data does not show that
removing human rights from the U.N. agenda would improve cooperation in
other areas; 197 it shows only that voting on human rights plays a large role in
the measures of polarization within the U.N.
A connection between bloc voting and the U.N. 's human rights agenda
is also suggested by the data on voting within the Human Rights Council
(HRC). A study focusing just on human rights has found that in both the
General Assembly and the HRC, "China, Russia and developing countries
pass regular resolutions undercutting Western human rights agendas." 198
Other studies found greater polarization in the HRC than in the
Commission 199 and that measures proposed by Cuba (one of the most
frequent proposers) "strongly polarize the member states of the UNHRC in
their voting."200
Polarization leads to several problems, including lengthy procedural
discussions and many repetitive resolutions.20 1 More importantly, however,
the voting blocs impede the ability of the General Assembly to make
meaningful progress on other issues.202 For example, Russia's use of force to
(unpublished Paper Presented at the 55th Annual Convention of the International Studies
Association), https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/81269013/Burmester_Jankowski_ISA_2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QV2R-BRQE]; see also Erik Voeten, Data and Analyses of Voting in the United Nations
General Assembly, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 54, 60--61
(2013) (providing statistical analysis of the "West-Rest'' divide).
195. Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev & Erik Voeten, Estimating Dynamic State
Preferences from United Nations Voting Data, 61 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 430, 444 (2017).
196. Id. For more discussion of states' voting patterns on human rights resolutions, see
generally Bernhard Boockmann & Axel Dreher, Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights
Resolutions in the United Nations?, 146 PUB. CHOICE 443 (2011).
197. Cf JOSEPH E. SCHWARTZBERG, TRANSFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM:
DESIGNS FOR A WORKABLE WORLD 26-27 (2013) (suggesting that almost all human rights issues
be taken off the U.N. General Assembly agenda).
198. Richard Gowan, Who is Winning on Human Rights at the UN?, EUR. COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_who_is_winning_on
_human_rights_at_the_un [https://perma.cc/C9CA-SDEK].
199. Simon Hug, Dealing with Human Rights in International Organizations, 15 J. HUM. RTS.
21, 22 (2016).
200. Simon Hug & Richard Lukas, Preferences or Blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human
Rights Council, 9 REV. INT'L ORG. 83, 103 (2014).
201. Freedman, More of the Same?, supra note 187, at 216.
202. See FREEDMAN, FAILING TO PROTECT, supra note 14, at 20-21 (2014); see also FASUW,
supra note 192, at 88; ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:279

annex Crimea was a violation of international law that undermines peace and
security in Eastern Europe. Yet when the U.N. General Assembly voted to
condemn Russia's actions, a large number of countries abstained, showing
that "many countries see this as a struggle between power blocs rather than
as a fundamental question of international order and do not accept the West's
self-identification as the guardian of liberal order. "203
The polarization costs of international human rights also appear to effect
the work of the U.N. Security Council. As described above, the Security
Council was not originally intended to address human rights issues. The
structure of the Security Council is ill-suited to that task. As Martii
Koskenniemi puts the point, the Security Council safeguards security as the
"technician of peace," but when it comes to human rights, "[i]ts composition,
procedures and practices are completely indefensible,"204 in part because it is
controlled by the "Great Powers"-the five veto-wielding permanent
members (the P-5).205 Decisions about human rights enforcement are
especially prone to the perception of selection bias and to the perception that
human rights serve as a "smokescreen for intervention or regime change,"206
in part because human rights violations are so widespread and yet go largely
unaddressed. These perceptions (or realities) exacerbate the "West v. rest"
divide. Human rights also are likely to be issues for which the Security
Council has difficulty reaching principled agreement, in part because Russia
and China hold different views about human rights enforcement than do the
other members of the P-5.207
2. UN Treaty Bodies.-Each of the ten core human rights treaties
establishes a U.N. human rights body. Although they differ in some
particulars, especially in their competence to investigate or visit countries
under their mandate, the human rights treaty bodies share many features and
tasks. Members of the treaty bodies are not states themselves (distinguishing
these bodies from the HRC) but are instead independent human rights experts
who are nominated and elected by the state parties. State parties are required
to submit periodic reports to the treaty bodies, which then review the states'

HISTORY 110---12 (2012); THOMAS G. WEISS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND
How TO FIX IT 53 (2d ed. 2012).
203. Piotr Buras et al., Ten Global Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis, EUR. COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (June 16, 2014), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ten_global_consequences
_of_ukraine272 [https://perma.cc/SP5T-YU3L].
204. Koskenniemi, supra note 179, at 344.
205. Id. at 338.
206. U.N., SCOR, 66th Sess., 6531st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531 (May 10, 2011); see
also RHOADS, supra note 17, at 2 (describing a shift at the U.N. towards "[t]he realization,
promotion, and protection of human rights," which has "translated into forms of international
engagement that are less consensual and more compulsory and coercive, justified by upholding
human rights").
207. See infra subpart ill(C).
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domestic legislation and policies and make recommendations to the states on
how to better comply with their obligations under the treaty. Treaty bodies
sometimes issue general comments on how to best interpret the treaties that
they are charged with enforcing. None of the decisions, recommendations,
comments, or other output of any treaty body is binding on any state. 208
The primary goal of the treaty bodies is to promote compliance with the
substantive obligations of the human rights treaties for which they are
responsible. Their main tools are the reporting and monitoring requirements,
coupled with the recommendations made by the treaty bodies and dialogue
with the state parties which results from this process. 209 The written and oral
presentation of data and viewpoints that are part of this process can clarify to
states what the treaty requires, and it may motivate and assist states to achieve
greater compliance.
Measuring the effectiveness of the treaty bodies (and the treaties
themselves) is notoriously difficult. 210 It is hard to assess compliance with the
substantive norms of the treaties, and it is even more difficult to determine
whether changes in norm compliance are caused by the treaty and its
monitoring body, as opposed to other factors. 211 Also, the treaty monitoring
bodies could make other enforcement mechanisms, such as domestic and
regional legal regimes, more successful. However, what data is available
suggests the treaty monitoring bodies are not especially effective. In 2010
and 2011, only 16% of the reports due to the treaty bodies were submitted on
time.212 Under some treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture, around
20% of state parties have never submitted a report, and for the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and some other treaties, the figure
is even higher.213 There was a relative decrease in reporting compliance
between 2000 and 2012. 214
The low level of reporting has a positive side. The treaty bodies lack the
resources to adequately evaluate even the reports they do receive so that there

208. See Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905, 907--08 (2009). For a detailed introduction, see HELLEN KELLER & GEIR
ULFSTEIN, UN HUMAN RlGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 1 2- (2012).
209. See Mechlem, supra note 208, at 907; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report on the Second Consultation of States on Treaty Body Strengthening, '1] 9 (Feb. 7-8, 2012);
Navanethem Pillay, Rep. of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on Strengthening the
Human Rights Treaty Body System, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/66/86 (June 26, 2012); G.A. Res. 68/268,
'I] 2 (Apr. 21, 2014).
210. See Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs
Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 175--76 (2013); Yuval Shany, Assessing the
Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. lNT'L L. 225, 239
(2012).
211. See Shany, supra note 210, at 239.
212. Pillay, supra note 209, at 9.
213. Id. at 22.
214. Id.
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is already a growing backlog ofreports awaiting consideration. 215 The time
lag between submission and consideration is costly because the drafters of
the reports may no longer be available when the report is considered,
undermining the potential for constructive dialogue on compliance.216
Scholars are generally skeptical about the effectiveness of the treaty
monitoring bodies, 217 although perhaps there is reason for some optimism in
countries with a strong civil society that engages with monitoring bodies on
an ongoing basis.218
The questionable effectiveness ofthe treaty bodies may also be inferred
from the repeated efforts to reform the system in order to improve their
work. 219 The most recent reform effort began in 2009, when the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights began a review oftreaty monitoring bodies
designed to make them more effective as a whole. 220 Professor Yuval Shany
evaluated the reform proposals and concluded that the report "refus[ed] to
acknowledge the 'elephant in the room'-namely, what appears to be a
conscious decision by a significant number of state-parties to maintain the
treaty bodies under permanent conditions of under-effectiveness."221 He
continues:
The fact that many states-parties have opposed, by and large, past
attempts to seriously explore such fundamental changes suggests,
however, that they do not wish to strengthen the treaty body system.
The unhappy situation ofthe UN treaty bodies may thus be explained
in large part by a tension between a superficial commitment by many
state-parties to the goal ofhuman rights promotion and a realpolitik
aversion to actual treaty implementation. 222
215. See Pillay, supra note 209, at 23.
216. JASPER KROMMENDUK, THE DOMESTIC IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROCESS
OF STATE REPORTING UNDER UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN THE NETHERLANDS, NEW
ZEALAND,AND FINLAND: PAPER-PuSHING OR POLICY PROMPTING? 14 (2014).
217. See, e.g., id. at 9-24; SUBEDI,supranote 14 at 88-94; EMILIEHAFNER-BURTON,MAKING
HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 86-115 (2013); ChristofHeyns & Frank Viljoen, The Impact of the
United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level,23 HUM. R.Q. 483,488,511 (2001).
218. See Creamer & Simmons, supra note 8, at 12 (finding participation in the review process
by a treaty monitoring body may provide an opening for constructive engagement and "small" but
"incremental" improvement in human rights protections).
219. See Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United
Nations Human Rights Treaty System, transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Comm'n on
Human Rights,,r 98, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (Mar. 27, 1997); U.N. High Comm'r for Human
Rights, The OHCHR Plan of Action: Protection and Empowerment, ,r,r 145-50 (May 2005),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/planaction.pdf [https://perma.cc/U89E-ZDKA].
220. Pillay, supra note 209, at 9.
221. Yuval Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Body
Reform, in DER STAAT IM RECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ECKART KLEIN ZUM 70 (Marten Breuer et al.
eds., 2013).
222. Id.; see also COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DoMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 140-41 (2014); KROMMENDUK,
supra note 216, at 12; SUBEDI, supra note 14, at 226-29, 255-56.
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That is the key point. States are not committed enough to the
international legal enforcement of human rights norms to establish a
successful system. This unwillingness helps explain why human rights are
understood in political terms. Most states lack a true commitment to the
meaningful enforcement of human rights norms as international law. Instead,
they are willing to enforce if doing so aligns with or furthers their other
political interests, which leads to selective enforcement. Yet the language and
the aspiration of international human rights law is of universal rights and
obligations. 223
If efforts to enforce human rights through the United Nations have no
costs on the other work of the United Nations or on international law as a
whole, then perhaps their apparently limited impact on human rights is of
little moment. But, as this section has argued, the selective enforcement and
other problems with human rights may make the other work of the United
Nations less successful. Those potential costs are not part of the
contemporary debate about human rights and international law, but they
should be.
D.

Conclusion

Human rights, and especially their transformation of sovereignty and
their enforcement through international law, are in a period of stasis and
decline. One potential objection is that any such decline is temporary or
cyclical. After all, states remain bound by substantive human rights treaties
and the customary international law protecting human rights. In a few years,
the international legal enforcement of human rights could be back on an
upswing. Maybe. But several factors suggest that the decline is longer-term,
including the relative decline in Western economic and political power,
broader global trends towards populism, and the selective and half-hearted
efforts by Western countries to promote human rights through international
law. Human rights themselves may, let us hope, improve over time, and the
drive and motivation to secure human rights will certainly continue, but
neither means that international human rights law should or must be the
preferred vehicle for doing so.
A second potential objection is that there is no decline because there was
no heyday: states never took the international legal enforcement of human
rights law seriously, even if activists did. As the doctrinal discussions above
illustrate, however, state practice in many areas changed around the turn of
the century, even if those doctrines were never fully implemented and their
on-the-ground effectiveness is contested.

223. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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II.

Human Rights and the Cost of Expansion
Human rights have not just purportedly transformed sovereignty and the
work of the United Nations; they have also changed what international
lawyers call the "doctrine of sources" as part of what one scholar has termed
the "expansionist project" of international human rights law. 224 The resulting
changes to the two primary sources of international law-treaties and
custom-have successfully ensured that a wide range of human rights norms
are legally protected by international law. But this elasticity in the doctrine
of sources has come at the price of widespread non- and under-compliance
with international human rights law. There has been a parallel development
in the U.N. Security Council. The work of the Security Council has expanded
to include international human rights, perhaps leading to diminished
credibility and effectiveness.
This Part considers whether greater non- and under-compliance with
human rights norms makes international law as a whole less credible and less
effective. Other authors have suggested this possibility, but with little
supporting analysis.225 This Part applies the most important theories of why
states comply with international law, including rational choice,
constructivism, and organizational sociology. They, along with studies of
social psychology and domestic law, all suggest that widespread
noncompliance with human rights will make the rest of international law less
effective and more costly to enforce. In other words, for whatever reason(s)
international law is able to generate compliance, that compliance is more
difficult to secure in the context of greater overall noncompliance.
Analogizing to criminal law, we might call this a "broken windows" theory
of international law. If it is correct, a decline in international human rights
law might ultimately result m benefits to international law as a whole, but
only if international law does not continue to shoulder the burden of
enforcing human rights as legally binding norms.
A.

Expanded Sources
International human rights law has expanded the two traditional sources
of international law: treaties and custom. Both sources have been stretched
to ensure that a broad array of human rights is governed by international law.

224. D'Aspremont, supra note 3, at 224; see also Cohen, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that human
rights (along with other forces) have changed the sources of international law).
225. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 3, at 67 ("For some, the patterns of noncompliance are proof
that international law is 'law' in name only."); Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations
of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 958 (2005)
(contending that an international human rights regime, without an enforcement mechanism, would
trivialize international law); cf KROMMENDIJK, supra note 216, at 43 (noting that state compliance
depends on qualities and legitimacy of international norms).
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1. Treaties.-Treaty law has changed in order to accommodate
international human rights instruments. Treaty law now permits reservations
to multilateral agreements without the consent of all contracting states (unless
the treaty provides otherwise), a change that has allowed states, in effect, to
undermine or even vitiate their consent to a treaty through far-reaching
reservations. 226 Based on an analogy to contracts, international law
traditionally required that, in order to be valid, a reservation must receive the
consent of all contracting parties to a treaty.227 This rule changed during the
middle of the twentieth century, initially in order to accommodate
reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.228 The International Court of Justice was asked whether
states which filed reservations to the Genocide Convention could nonetheless
be parties to that Convention.229 The Court's opinions abandoned the
unanimity rule in a 7-to-5 vote, with the majority emphasizing that the
Genocide Convention was "adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing
purpose."230 In this kind of convention, "the contracting States do not have
any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest,
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison
d'etre of the convention."231 The object and purpose of the Convention
accordingly implied that as many states as possible should participate, so
reservations should be permitted as long as they did not "sacrifice the very
object of the Convention."232
The general approach of the International Court of Justice was
eventually adopted by the International Law Commission in the draft articles
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), but only after two
Special Rapporteurs sought to preserve the unanimity rule. 233 As finally
drafted, the VCLT rules apply not just to human rights agreements but to all
treaties.234 Some treaties prohibit reservations, but many do not, and states
226. FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO
MULTILATERAL TREATIES 156 (1988) ("A reservation resembles a breach in that it also constitutes
a derogation from an obligation. The derogation is however a legitimate one.").
227. Id. at 22-23.
228. Id. at 17, 21.
229. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 19511.C.J. Rep. 15 (May 28).
230. Id. at 23.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 24.
233. See HORN, supra note 226, at 20-21 (documenting the change of the unanimity rule after
discussions at the 5th session of the U.N. General Assembly and the ICJ decision, while notifying
that Special Rapporteurs Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice insisted on maintaining the unanimity rule);
see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at 424-36
(1989) (surveying discussions of reservation rules before the International Law Commission and
U.N. General Assembly).
234. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 19-21, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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have made significant reservations to treaties governing a diverse set of
topics from whaling to private international law. 235 Reservations to all of the
treaties (human rights or otherwise) can be seen as a direct byproduct of the
controversial change to treaty law in order to accommodate international
human rights lawmaking.
It is true that the VCLT only sets default rules. States can and do contract
out of those rules through specific treaty language, such as language that
prohibits reservations entirely. The default language remains significant,
however, as the example of the International Convention on the Regulation
of Whaling (Whaling Convention) demonstrates. When the Whaling
Convention came into force, the old unanimity rule applied, pursuant to
which Denmark's proposed reservation was rejected.236 Denmark abandoned
its reservation and became a party. 237 Since the new default rule has become
part ofcustomary international law, states have made a variety ofreservations
to the Whaling Convention, including Iceland, which made a reservation to
its basic terms and yet ultimately became a party despite the opposition of
many states. 238 It is also true that the ability to use reservations may induce
some states to become parties to treaties, encouraging broader participation,
as the International Court ofJustice reasoned in the language quoted above. 239
Whatever advantages there are to reservations, however, they may also be
costly to international law as a whole.
Reservations to human rights treaties are generally more common than
reservations to other kinds oftreaties. 240 States have also made especially far
reaching reservations to human rights treaties. Some parties to the
Convention for Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for example,
235. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41 (India reservation at 2753 U.N.T.S. 412); Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (Ireland reservation at 2213
U.N.T.S. 122); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261;
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, l U.N.T.S. 15
(although the Convention includes no explicit language on reservations, reservations have been
made, Turkey reservation at 70 U.N.T.S. 266); see also Alexander Gillespie, Iceland's Reservation
at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 977, 977-78 (2003) (chronicling
Iceland's three attempts to modify its reservation for readmission to the International Whaling
Commission); Ulrich G. Schroeter, Reservations and the CISG: The Borderland of Uniform
International Sales Law and Treaty Law After Thirty-Five Years, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 203, 20607 (2015) (discussing the reservations made in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods).
236. Gillespie, supra note 235, at 982.
237. Id. at 981-82.
238. Id. at 977-78. There was also a dispute about whether the International Whaling
Commission had the competence to determine the validity of the reservation. Id. at 993-96.
239. See also Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 331-40 (2006)
(defending a default rule favoring reservations because reservations may increase treaty depth and
because they yield valuable information).
240. Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human
Rights Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397, 397-98 (2007).
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have made sweeping reservations to its substantive terms. Saudi Arabia
included a general reservation to the Convention that provides: "In case of
contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of islamic
[sic] law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory
terms of the Convention."241 Saudi Arabia has a truly dismal record on the
rights of women and did not, to name just one example, permit women to
drive cars until very recently.242
Wide-ranging and sometimes crippling reservations to human rights
treaties have led treaty-monitoring bodies to declare such reservations invalid
and also that invalid reservations are severable so that the treaty remains in
force, but absent the reservation.243 Although this practice by treaty
monitoring bodies is controversial,244 if accepted it would permit human
rights treaties to govern conduct which the contracting state intended to
exclude from the treaty entirely. That conduct is likely to violate the treaty
otherwise there is little reason to make the reservation in the first place
leading to even more conduct that is inconsistent with the terms of the treaty.
When a state engages in conduct that would be prohibited by a treaty
but for that state's reservation, the state is formally compliant with the treaty
(so long as the reservation is permissible), but the conduct is "non
conforming"-because it does not correspond to the terms of the treaty. The
practice of reservations, designed to encourage widespread ratification of
human rights treaties, has thus resulted in widespread nonconformity with
and violations of the terms of treaties, especially (but not exclusively) human
rights treaties.
2. Custom.-The rules governing customary international law have also
become more flexible so as to incorporate human rights into international
law. Today, customary international law norms can be generated based on
what states say, even if their actual conduct does not conform to the norm.245
241. See Linda M. Keller, The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Evolution and (Non)implementation Worldwide, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 35, 39 (2004)
(quoting Saudi Arabia's reservation made at 2121 U.N.T.S. 342).
242. Ben Hubbard, Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www .nytimes.corn/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html [https://
perma/cc.M8AD-J559].
243. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 531, 531 (2002). These changes in how human rights treaties are interpreted and applied
are apparently leading to changes in treaty law as a whole. See generally Marko Milanovic & Linos
Alexander Sicilianos,Reservations to Treaties: An Introduction, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1055 (2013).
244. Goodman,supra note 243,at 531.
245. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 LC.J. Rep. 14, ,r 186 (June 27); Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Impact on the
Process ofthe Formation ofCustomary International Law, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTSLAW
ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 111, 111-31; Anthea Elizabeth Roberts,
Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J.
INT'LL. 757,758 (2001).
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This change means that customary international law corresponds less to the
actual conduct of states, which in tum means there will be more violations at
the point in time when the norm crystalizes into customary international law.
For example, customary international law prohibits torture.246 The
primary sources relied upon to demonstrate the customary international
prohibition on torture include the following: U.N. General Assembly
resolutions condemning torture; the prohibition on torture found in domestic
constitutions; states' universal condemnation of torture; and treaties such as
the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the Convention Against Torture. The prohibition on torture is
even ajus cogens norm of international law, meaning that it is understood as
absolute and nonderogable.247 Torture itself is "a direct attack on the core of
the dignity and integrity of human beings."248 Yet torture is widely
practiced-even if it is also widely denounced as violating international law.
A well-placed observer recently concluded "torture is practiced in more than
90 percent of all countries and constitutes a widespread practice in more than
50 percent of all countries."249 As another example, customary international
law is said to include a right to food, or at least a right to be free from
hunger.250 Yet many people around the world are not free from hunger and
many governments fail to remedy or are complicit in the scarcity of food in
their countries.251
Like changes to the law of treaties, change in the rules governing the
formation of customary international law is justified on the grounds that it
permits the widespread adoption of international human rights law, which is
considered a valuable step forward despite the violations it accepts.252 The
elements needed to show the formation of custom are in general contested,
and the actual content of customary international law tends to be vague so
that the application of customary norms to particular facts is frequently
contested. 253 As well, basing custom on state declarations rather than on their
actions is an issue that extends beyond human rights. Nevertheless, human
rights have unmistakably pushed customary international law towards what

246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 702(d) (AM. L. INST. 1987).
247. Manfred Nowak, What's in a Name? The Prohibitions on Torture and Ill Treatment Today,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 307, 307 (Conor Gearty & Costas
Douzinas eds., 2012).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Srnita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 705 (2006).
251. See SIMONE HUTIER, STARVATION AS A WEAPON: DOMESTIC POLICIES OF DELIBERATE
STARVATION AS A MEANS TO AN END UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (2015).
252. See Roberts, supra note 245, at 764-65.
253. Larry R. Helfer & Ingrid Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice
Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 576 (2016).
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some call a "tremendous implementation gap."254 As one observer puts it,
international human rights got "sidetracked off into an international arena of
pious declarations and unenforceable agreements."255 These problems have
generally been considered, if at all, only in terms of their costs for
international human rights itself. But various theories of compliance with
international law suggest that widespread noncompliance with international
human rights law will tend to make the enforcement of other international
law more difficult and costly.
B.

A "Broken Windows" Effect?
Changes in the doctrine of sources to accommodate human rights have
made international law more elastic; it now permits the adoption of norms
despite greater noncompliance and more nonconforming behavior. And
beyond the changes to the formal sources of international law, there are other
widespread violations of international human rights law, such as a failure to
abide by even those treaty norms to which no reservation was made. Such
failures extend even to ministerial tasks, such as filing required reports to
treaty-monitoring bodies.256 There is a parallel development in the mandate
of the U.N. Security Council, which has grown to include many human rights
issues that the Council cannot remedy or prevent.
These changes to international law may encourage noncompliance with
other international legal norms, not just those governing human rights. The
intuition here is an imperfect analogy to the "broken windows" theory of
crime prevention: widespread violations of human rights law may be a
symbol of unaccountability,257 a signal that "no one cares" about violations
of international law and that "no one is in charge."258 Accountability is a
central concern of public international law. The system lacks a centralized
enforcement mechanism, and as a result, compliance and effectiveness pose
important-some would say fundamental--challenges to the relevance of

254. Nowak, supra note 247, at 307.
255. Conor Gearty, Spoils for Which Victor? Human Rights Within the Democratic State, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAw, supra note 247, at 214. As with treaties,
the change to the rules of the formation of custom are not limited to the customary international law
of human rights, instead they are changes to customary international law generally. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey R. Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction
in Prosecutor v. Tadic, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 708--09 (describing a customary norm of international
humanitarian law). See Arnold N. Pronto, "Human-Rightism" and the Development of General
International Law, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 753 (2007), for a discussion of the significant influence
of human rights norms and imperatives over the development of general international law.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
257. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: the Police and Neighborhood
Safety, THE ATLANTIC (March 1982).
258. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291,303, 305--06 (1998).
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public international law. 259 In this context, behavior that signals a lack of
accountability may be especially damaging to the enforcement and
deterrence of international law writ large. To some extent, this intuition has
already been voiced within the human rights discourse.260
The domestic broken windows theory argues that "mere" "disorder" or
"victimless" crimes lead to more serious violations of the law.261 Human
rights violations are not victimless and can impose significant costs to human
lives and dignity. As well, the broken windows theory of domestic law
enforcement may depend upon and itself create certain subjects or categories
of people, such as the "honest" versus the "disorderly," upon which social
influences operate differently. 262 Although the analogy is thus imperfect
and despite great controversy over the domestic broken windows theory and
its relationship to domestic policing263-the question remains: if states are in
widespread violation of, or noncompliance with, international human rights
law, are they (and other states) more likely to violate other norms of
international law? Models of state compliance with international law
rational choice, constructivism, the sociology of international
organizations-answer this question affirmatively,264 and so do empirical
studies of social psychology and domestic law.
259. See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work? A Constructivist Expansion,
27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 636, 641 (2009) (book review); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF & MARK A.
POLLACK, International Law and International Relations: Introducing an Interdisciplinary
Dialogue, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 3, 5-21 (2013) [hereinafter INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES].
260. NEIER, supra note 202, at 259; Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A
Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 609 (1984); see also supra note 231 and
accompanying text.
261. See generally George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders'
Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 1217 (1998) (applying the broken
windows theory to police common, victimless, and minor offenses).
262. Harcourt, supra note 258, at 297.
263. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Author of "Broken Windows" Policing Defends His Theory, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/nyregion/author-of-broken-windows
-policing-defends-his-theory.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/4PBN-J63R].
264. Some rational choice scholars argue that international law does little to change state
behavior and that what appears as compliance is usually coercion or coincidence of interest. See
JACK L. GoLDSMITH & ER1C A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-18 (2005).
That work is not directly relevant to this section, which argues that the reasons to think that
international law does generate compliance also suggest that widespread non- or underenforcement
of some international law will make compliance with other international law more difficult to
secure. Some liberal international relations scholarship is also not directly relevant. Generally,
liberal theorists do not take the state as a unitary actor, and they view compliance as at least partially
a function of domestic processes. See Andrew Moravscik, Liberal Theories of International Law,
in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 259, at 83, 84. Beth Simmons, for example,
argues that international human rights treaties can be effective because the commitment to the treaty
empowers domestic political groups or parts of the state. BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 125-29 (2009). Her work is limited,
however, to compliance with international human rights treaties and does not discuss compliance
generally. Similarly, Harold Koh describes a transnational process that leads states to incorporate
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1. Rational Choice.-Rational choice theories of state behavior support
the broken windows analogy. They assume that states are rational and self
interested.265 They take state preferences as exogenous and fixed, and they
assume states have "no innate preference for complying with international
law."266 Scholars have focused on several mechanisms that states use to
enforce their international commitments, including reputation, retaliation,
and reciprocity.267 Beginning with reputation, widespread violations of
international human rights norms by states mean that, as a whole, states will
have a poorer reputation for compliance and that the (many) noncomplying
states themselves will have a poorer reputation for compliance. These two
drops in reputation-one in states' overall reputation for noncompliance and
one in the reputation of particular noncomplying states-should produce two
effects.
First, rational choice scholars argue that, on the margin, states with little
reputation for compliance may decide it is "too costly to build a good
reputation."268 A diminished reputation for compliance by many states as a
result of widespread violations of international human rights norms means
that more states have an overall reputation of noncompliance. As a result,
overall noncompliance with international law will increase because more
states will simply give up on compliance.
Second, and more importantly, if states as a whole tend to expect
noncompliance from each other, the costs of entering into treaties or
developing norms of customary international law become higher for all
states. A baseline reputation of noncompliance among states generally means
that states will have to do more in a treaty agreement to generate trustworthy
commitments (such as monitoring noncompliance), making some
agreements not worth the time or effort. 269 Similarly, if entities tasked with

international norms to become internalized through domestic law and domestic actors. Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2651-58 (1997). Koh
uses human rights as his main example but leaves open the question of how the relevant issue
networks and epistemic communities form and whether they are influenced by developments in
other areas of international law. In a more recent article, Koh suggests that his theory of compliance
is drawn from the work of Tom Tyler. Koh, supra note 128, at 973 n.2. Tyler's work is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 307-12.
265. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 17 (2008).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 33-34; ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 10, 115-27 (2006); Rachel
Brewster, Reputation in International Relations and International Law Theory, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 259, at 524, 533.
268. Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379,
382 (2006).
269. See ANDREW H. KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 26, 119
(2005); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory ofInternational Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1823, 1849 (2002).
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formal enforcement-such as the treaty monitoring bodies discussed in the
next section-fail to ensure compliance, states may be deterred from making
additional international commitments,270 while the possibility of formal
enforcement may at the same time make informal enforcement by the parties
less likely.271
Rational choice scholars also argue that retaliation and reciprocity
generate compliance with international law.272 These mechanisms, too, are
undermined by widespread violations of international human rights law.
First, as mentioned above, a widespread belief that states do not comply with
international obligations makes it more difficult to generate trustworthy
commitments, even if those commitments might be enforced through
retaliation or reciprocity rather than directly through reputation. Second,
states benefit from having a reputation for using reciprocity or retaliatory
sanctions, which can be costly to impose. A state contemplating a violation
of its international legal obligations might be deterred from doing so if the
state (or states) that would be aggrieved by the breach has (or have) a general
reputation for imposing sanctions.273 The widespread under- and
noncompliance with international human rights law can lead states to believe
there is general unwillingness to impose retaliatory sanctions for violations
of international law.
Building on rational choice models, behavioral law and economics
scholars hypothesize that states' willingness to engage in retaliation is partly
a function of their perception of fairness and bias. 274 If correct, this suggests
another problem with widespread violations of international human rights
law: the view that international human rights law is selectively enforced. If
only some states are "punished" for human rights violations, the result may
be perceptions of bias and unfairness in the international legal system as a
whole. Those perceptions may, in turn, make states generally less willing to
impose sanctions on other states, in particular those which they perceive as
receiving unfair treatment in the human rights context. One possible example
of this dynamic is some states' reluctance to condemn Russia's annexation
of Crimea, which observers attribute in part to non-Western states'
"conviction that the West enjoys an unjustified position of privilege in the
international system."275

270. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 267, at178-79, 181.
271. Id. at26-27, 84-109.
272. GUZMAN, supra note 265, at33-34.
273. Id. at47-48; SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 267, at115-17.
274. Anne vanAaken,Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT'LL. J. 421,
434-35 (2014).
275. See Buras et al., supra note 203.
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One objection to the arguments advanced in this section is that states'
reputations may be compartmentalized and issue-specific.276 If so,
widespread violations of international human rights agreements will not
create reputational losses to individual states or to states as a whole in other
issue areas such as trade or security. Similarly, making a reservation might
signal to other states that the reserving state is especially compliant, because
rather than simply violating the treaty, the state instead made the reservation
and became under- rather than noncompliant.277 But significant reservations
may instead lead to less regard for international legal rules as a whole by
signaling that states get to pick and choose their commitments or that their
consent to the treaty is not genuine,278 thereby decreasing general reputations
for compliance. In any event, in the context of retaliatory sanctions for human
rights violations, there is no reason to assume that states imposing such
sanctions do not see their general reputational capital for imposing sanctions
grow as a result. 279 In the end, these are empirical questions to which there is
no definitive answer. But ·if reputation does not cross into other issue areas,
then it is not "an important cause of compliance with a wide range of
agreements."280 Most rational choice and human rights scholars thus assume
or argue that reputation is not entirely issue-specific. 281
2. Constructivism. -Constructivist theories of state behavior also
support the broken window analogy and suggest that widespread violations
of human rights norms will result in reduced effectiveness for the rest of
international law. Constructivist accounts of international relations focus on
the social construction of identity. 282 Under this view, international norms,
including international legal norms, have a constitutive function in that they

276. See George W. Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95,109-10 (2002); van Aaken, supra note 274, at 476--77.
277. Swaine, supra note 239, at 338.
278. lneke Boerfijn, Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 63, 65; see Laurence R Helfer,
Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579,1641 (2005) (noting that reservations may signal that a state
is uncooperative, even if compliant); see also Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation,
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 263-64 (2009) (describing arguments about the impact of treaty
reservations on state reputation).
279. See GUZMAN, supra note 265, at 46--47 (citing President Clinton's statement that the
United States has "an interest in standing up against the principle of ethnic cleansing" as an example
of an effort to bolster the reputational capital of the United States).
280. Brewster, supra note 278, at 261.
281. E.g., id.; GUZMAN, supra note 265, at 100-11 ("[I]t is likely that states have different
reputations in different issue areas, but these reputations are related to one another."); SCOTT &
STEPHAN, supra note 267, at 118 ("Reputations survive particular treaties and similar
arrangements.").
282. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept ofCompliance as a Function ofCompeting Conceptions
ofInternational Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345,358 (1998).
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help create the desires and preferences of states.283 Thus, ideas and beliefs
(not just material interests), which are formed through interaction and
communication, help determine how states behave, including their
compliance with international law.284
Drawing on the work of legal philosopher Lon Fuller, influential
constructivist scholars Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope argue that
international legal obligations arise from communities of practice which have
shared understandings and which generate norms with specific characteristics
of legality.285 These characteristics of legality include generality,
consistency, and alignment between legal norms and the actions of
officials.286 A community of practice, grounded in shared understanding, that
generates and maintains such norms results in a "practice of legality."287 It is
not the formal characteristics of instruments and norms that give rise to legal
obligation, but instead this practice of legality. 288
A communities-of-practice analysis suggests that states' obvious non
and under-compliance with legal norms inhibits the development of a
meaningful community of practice with shared values. Indeed, Brunnee and
Toope question whether the prohibition on torture qualifies as a norm of
international law at all because of the misalignment between the norm and
actual official conduct.289 They reason that "a widespread failure to uphold
the law as formally enunciated leads to a sense of hypocrisy which
undermines fidelity to law."290 Their account is telling. In a horizontal,
decentralized legal system, whether it relies on reputation or on shared
normative values, widespread "violations" may be especially costly, for they
suggest that states do not care about their reputations for compliance or that
the shared normative values are not so shared after all.
3. Organizational Sociology.-Theories of state behavior based on
organizational sociology support the broken windows thesis by suggesting
that systematic violations of international human rights law will result in
lower compliance with other international law. This work, too, could be
characterized as constructivist, but it focuses on a different process of social

283. See id. (giving a constructivist reading of international law as an account of "legal
relations," "patterns of interactive behavior," and "particularizing society's universal purposes").
284. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM.
POL. Ser. REV. 384, 385 (1994).
285. JUTTA BRUNNEE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 53-54 (2010). Brunnee & Toope compare their work to that
of other constructivists. Id. at 52-65.
286. Id. at 6.
287. Id. at 46-52, 65-77, 350-52.
288. Id. at 46---52, 100.
289. Id. at 250-68.
290. Id. at 232.
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interaction to form state preferences: acculturation. 291 A state's or
individual's identification with a group can lead to cognitive and social
pressures to conform to the group's behavior. Here, the mechanisms of
influence on state behavior are social expectations and cultural identity, not
necessarily acceptance of the legitimacy of the norm. Organizational
sociology predicts acculturation will shape the formal structure of
institutions, which are embedded in wider institutional environments, but that
convergence across institutions (called isomorphism) may not actually result
in functional changes and results. States appear to behave in just this way in
the global community: there is remarkable isomorphism in structural
organization and policy commitments at the global level, but this
convergence is decoupled from any significant changes within states
themselves. 292 Or, put more succinctly, the sociology of organizations
predicts "cross-national isomorphism irrespective of local circumstance,"
which is precisely what the data shows. 293
The acculturation model of state behavior suggests widespread
noncompliance with human rights norms will lead to noncompliance with
other international legal obligations. Pervasive noncompliance means the
"global scripts as members of world society"294 does not include actual
compliance with international norms but instead mere commitment to them.
The name organizational sociologists give this dynamic is "decoupling."295
Decoupling appears itself to be a global script for behavior. That is, both the
prosocial pressures applied by groups and the psychological benefits of
conforming to group norms operate on the global level to push states toward
making international commitments, but not to successfully implement those
commitments.296 This particular global script may have special purchase in
international human rights law, but it also operates in other contexts:
environmental policy, education curricula, and militarization. 297 Ryan
Goodman and Derek Jinks present decoupling in positive terms because it
facilitates the global adoption of human rights norms. 298 Other scholars have
challenged whether acculturation is normatively defensible in large part
291. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
1HROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2013) [hereinafter GooDMAN & JINKS, SOCIALIZING
STATES]; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621,626 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence
States].
292. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 291, at 646-49.
293. See id. at 647-55 (surveying empirical studies).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 649.
296. Id. at 643.
297. Id. at 648; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internationalization and
Compliance with Human Rights Law: A Rejoinder to Roda Mushkat, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 443, 444
(2009).
298. See Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 291, at 670.
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because decoupling simply accepts widespread violations of international
law.299
Two specific aspects of the acculturation model suggest that widespread
non- and under-compliance with human rights law will lead to
noncompliance with international law as a whole. First, Goodman and Jinks
argue that there is a world polity with global scripts of behavior and global
cultural models pursuant to which states are "defined" and "legitimated."300
The claim of worldwide scripts and worldwide cultural norms undercuts the
possibility that widespread noncompliance with and violation of international
human rights norms have an isolated impact only on human rights norms and
only within a specified human rights community. Second, the evidence of
decoupling suggests there are already powerful, global behavioral scripts
pursuant to which states ignore problems with on-the-ground enforcement of
and compliance with international norms. 301 Expansive human rights norms
that accept widespread noncompliance may have initially generated what has
now become a global script. Even if not, they may have made a powerful
contribution to an existing, global nonchalance about violations of
international law.
4. Social Psychology.-Research from social psychology also suggests
the broken windows analogy is correct. Social psychologists writing on
domestic legal systems have developed a causal theory of legitimacy and
measured its impact on actual compliance rates.302 In this work, "value
based" legitimacy is defined as an individual's sense of obligation and
willingness to obey, as measured by questions about whether individuals feel

299. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 971 (2005); Harold
Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 978-81 (2005). But cf
GoODMAN & JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES, supra note 291, at 135-65 (defending the normative
value of acculturation).
300. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1749, 1756--57 (2003).
301. Goodman and Jinks argue that decoupling is evidence of acculturation but that
acculturation can occur without decoupling, that decoupling is not necessarily inconsistent with
deep reform, and that even decoupling that initially hinders compliance may eventually lead to the
progression of more meaningful change over time. GooDMAN & JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES,
supra note 291, at 135-65. Their account nevertheless presents evidence of widespread decoupling
and describes a model of state behavior pursuant to which states are socialized to conform their
behavior at the international level without actually complying with the legal norm through their
behavior domestically.
302. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-5, 19-39 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006);
Margaret Levi et al., The Reasons for Compliance with Law, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION,
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70, 70-71 (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012). The international legal
theorist Thomas Franck also argued that the "legitimacy" of international law generates compliance.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3, 25-26 (1990). Franck did
not, however, offer any well-developed causal mechanism to explain why legitimacy causes
compliance.
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obligated to obey the law.303 This kind of legitimacy is linked to actual
compliance with the law ("behavioral legitimacy"), as measured by precinct
level police data and self-reporting from respondents.304 The factors that tend
to generate "value-based" legitimacy include "trustworthiness in
government," which depends on the government's general ability to solve
problems and to enforce laws.305 The perception of widespread
noncompliance with the law is correlated with a lower trustworthiness in
government,306 and accordingly with lower legitimacy and compliance. The
general result is supported by data from both the United States and Africa. 307
States are obviously not individuals, and the determinants of individual
behavior are not necessarily those of state behavior.308 Decisions about state
behavior are, however, made by individuals or groups of individuals.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests states' decision-making about treaty
commitments is susceptible to some of the same cognitive biases that impair
individual decision-making, including salience effects, status-quo bias, and
peer effects. 309 Along the same lines, the acculturation research described
above argues that "[s]tate socialization" is empirically measurable and that it
is a process explained by the "beliefs, conduct, and social relations of
individuals." 310 Research on social psychology and domestic law shows that
the propensity of individuals to comply with law is an indirect function of
their belief that the government is good at solving problems and good at
enforcing laws. Noncompliance with law undermines both beliefs. If we can
extrapolate from individual to state behavior, this research from social
psychology suggests the perception of widespread noncompliance with
international law across issue areas will tend to undermine people's sense of
obligation and willingness to obey.
C.

Expanded Mandate: Credibility and the United Nations

International human rights law has also expanded the work of the U.N.
Security Council. The Security Council is charged with maintaining
international peace and security, and it has the power to impose coercive

303. Levi et al., supra note 302, at 70-72, 74--75, 82.
304. Id. at 82-83, 89.
305. Id. at 73, 76--77.
306. Id. at 73.
307. Id. at 89-90.
308. See van Aaken, supra note 274, at 441-49 (discussing the relationship between individual
and state behavior and its implications for both rational choice and behavioral law and economics
analysis).
309. See Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty
Design, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 349-55 (2013); see also van Aaken, supra note 274, at 449-80
(describing insights from behavioral law and economics research about individuals that help to
explain the behavior of states).
310. See GoODMAN & JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES, supra note 291, at 41.
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measures including the use of force.311 Its functions were originally viewed
as separate from those of the General Assembly, and it was the General
Assembly that had the responsibility to promote voluntary respect for human
rights through its supervision of the Economic and Social Council. 312 Until
the end of the Cold War, the Security Council played "a negligible role in the
protection of human rights," but since then it has shown a "greater readiness
to invoke human rights provisions"313-at least sometimes.
Even before the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council
condemned the "illegal" and "racist minority" in Southern Rhodesia and
eventually imposed mandatory sanctions based on human rights violations
by Southern Rhodesia.314 But the Security Council expanded its powers in
the decades since the end of the Cold War by adopting a broad definition of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.315 Humanitarian
crises and refugee flows, repression of civilian populations, serious human
rights violations, impunity for violation of international humanitarian law,
and the overthrow of a democratically elected regime have all warranted
action under Chapter VII, at least in the view of the Security Council itself. 316
In some of these situations, the cross-border effects of human rights
violations were clear, so that the link to international (rather than internal)
peace and security was straightforward.317 In other situations, the link
between the two was more tenuous.318 The Security Council's increased
activity in the field of human rights has gone so far that some have. said "[b]y

311. U.N. Charter arts. 39,41-42.
312. See supra text accompanying note 182; see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Security
Council and Human Rights-from Discretion to Promote to Obligation to Protect in SECURING
HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,supra note
180, at 36-37.
313. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Norms and Machinery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
UNITED NATIONS 439,454 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Davis eds.,2007).
314. S.C. Res. 455, ,i 4 (Nov. 23, 1979); S.C. Res. 246 (Mar. 14, 1968); S.C. Res. 245, ,i2
(Jan. 25,1968).
315. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 312, at 38-39; Fen 0. Hampson & Christopher K. Penny,
Human Security, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS,supra note 313, at 539,
554; Shraga,supra note 180,at 11-13.
316. Koskenniemi,supra note 179,at 341-42; Shraga,supra note 180,at 12-13.
317. The harms to international peace and security are clear when the humanitarian crises
involve serious flows ofrefugees. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3,1992) (addressing armed conflict
in Somalia); S.C. Res. 827 (May 25,1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10,1999) (addressing the grave humanitarian situation
in Kosovo).
318. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change
in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 355,365--06,366 n.55 (2012) (listing cases where the Security Council
found a threat to international peace and security relying on the significant "magnitude ofthe human
tragedy'' in domestic conflicts). The decisions of the U.N. Security Council as to the scope of its
own powers are controlling,at least as a practical matter.
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the end of the 20th century" the Security Council was "at the centre of the
human rights protection system."319
Broadening the Council's tasks to include the protection of human rights
expanded the room for failure in performing those tasks, potentially resulting
in costs to the organization's credibility. Failure to act or to follow through
on a broad set of promises, implicit or explicit, makes the Security Council
look ineffective and weak. The Council will thus, as one scholar put it, "have
to face up to the consequences of its inability to make reality of its inflated
promises."320 A broader mandate also has the potential to further increase the
perception of bias and selectivity,321 which may lead to polarization and
diminished effectiveness of the United Nations as a whole.322 The change in
U.N. Security Council-authorized peacekeeping serves as an example. As
peacekeeping mandates expanded over the past two decades to focus on
human rights and the protection of civilians, its work has been viewed as
more political, less impartial, and in many respects, less successful. 323
Credibility and polarization costs have also resulted from the U.N.
Security Council's response to Libya and its subsequent failure to act in
Syria. Russia and China abstained from (but did not veto) Security Council
Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force in Libya to protect
civilians from the imminent threat of massive human rights violations. 324
Whether that Resolution is best read to have authorized the use of air strikes
to facilitate the rebel ousting of Qaddafi (in addition to merely protecting
civilians) is disputed.325 But it is clear that Russia and China became skeptical

319. Shraga,supra note 180, at 13.
320. Koskenniemi, supra note 179, at 346; see also SUBEDI, supra note 14 at 27-28; JEAN
MARIE GUEHENNO, THE FOG OF PEACE: A MEMOIR OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE
21ST CENTURY 305 (2015). To be sure, there are other aspects of the United Nation's human rights
work which also undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the organization as whole,including
human rights violations resulting from the actions of the Security Council, the oil-for-food scandal,
sexual abuse and gross misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers, and the tragic cholera epidemic in Haiti.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Katz, In the Time of Cholera, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/ 10/in-t\he-time-of-cholera [https://perma.cc/3MMQ-TRPK].
321. See Payandeh, supra note 318, at 398 ("As the Security Council becomes more active,its
selective course of action becomes ever more apparent. And with the increasing awareness of this
selectivity the international community's acceptance of the Security Council practice might decline
significantly."); see also Joanna Weschler, Acting on Human Rights (arguing that the Security
Council is a "political body'' and is likely to be guided by "national interests"), in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 139,at 259,273.
322. See supra subpart I(C).
323. See RHOADS,supra note 17, at 64--80,172-91.
324. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves "No-Fly Zone" over Libya,
Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5
Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Security Council Press
Release 2011].
325. Payandeh, supra note 318,at 383-86.
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of the Resolution and its use to assist in the ousting of Qaddafi.326 The regime
change aspect of the intervention appeared to many countries as the use of
human rights and humanitarian issues as a smokescreen for the removal of
Qaddafi, a result explicitly desired by the West.327 As one writer puts it, the
use of force in Libya has "fueled speculations as to which other countries are
also likely candidates for intervention" by Western countries.328 Cooperation
between Russia and Western countries on other issues became more difficult.
These are polarization costs.
The United Nations' actions with respect to Libya also led to credibility
costs. As the intervention in Libya proceeded, the Syrian government used
increasingly violent measures to quell domestic unrest. 329 The conflict
spiraled into a civil war, killing hundreds of thousands of people. 330 The
Syrian rebels have hoped for years for a U.N. Security Council resolution
authorizing the use of force to assist them, yet the Council has taken no
meaningful action.331 The broader mandate of the Security Council over mass
atrocities and other human rights violations leads to a loss of credibility when
the Council is hamstrung by political differences and accordingly cannot act
in response to massive atrocities in violation of human rights law. 332

326. See, e.g., Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with the Libya Government Envoy (Jr:x:$
*:l'mn!ff_l8 8 i?Jl!.*iJJi¥Jffj l:ti!Eil&Jf.f!lif-f!), TODAY'S CHINA (June 8, 2011), http://www.gov.cn/
jrzg/2011-06/08/content_1879973.htm [https://perma.cc/5V39-VTC9] (declaring China's desire
for a prompt cease-fire and respect for the sovereignty of Libya and the right to self-determination
of the Libyan people) (translation available upon request); Nabi Abdullaev, Lavrov Eases Libya
Stance, but NATO Rift Stays, MOSCOW TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), http://oldtmt.vedomosti.ru/
news/article/tmt/435194.html [http://perma.ccNYU5-WLMU] (stating Russia's view that the
Resolution did not sanction regime change in Libya).
327. See, e.g., Security Council Press Release 2011, supra note 324 (reporting that the German
Ambassador intended the Security Council to send a message to Colonel Qaddafi that "their time is
over [and] they must relinquish power immediately"); see generally U'.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6531st
mtg. at 11, 17-18, 20, 34, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531 (May 10, 2011) (noting that representatives of
Brazil, South Africa, China, and Nicaragua voiced concern that the protection of civilians could be
used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change).
328. See Payandeh, supra note 318, at 397.
329. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: WORLD REPORT 2012, at 624--31 (2012).
330. Id. at 624.
331. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution
Condemning Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, Following Veto by Russian Federation, U.N. Press
Release SC/12791 (Apr. 12, 2017); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt
Two Draft Resolutions on Syria Despite Appeals for Action Preventing Impending Humanitarian
Catastrophe in Aleppo, U.N. Press Release SC/12545 (Oct. 8, 2016); see also supra note 147.
332. See SUBEDI, supra note 14, at 22-28; Einsiedel et al., Conclusion: The Security Council
and a World in Crisis, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 139, at
827, 870; Roland Paris, Is It Possible to Meet the "Responsibility to Protect"?, WASH. POST
(Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.corn/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/09/is-it
possible-to-meet-the-responsibility-to-protect/?utm_term=.ac089fd96769 [https://perma.cc/UZ2L
N6BM]; cf Ganesh Sitaraman, Credibility and War Powers, 27 HARV. L. REV. F. 123, 123 (2014)
(arguing in the context of war powers that past inaction does not necessarily result in a lack of
credibility).
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Conclusion

As international human rights law expanded the doctrine of sources and
the work of the United Nations to include an ever-growing set of legal
prohibitions and demands, there has been little discussion of what impact this
growth may have on the rest of international law. Yet the most important and
relevant theories of compliance and effectiveness in international law, from
rational choice to constructivist, posit that widespread noncompliance with
human rights norms will make cooperation and compliance more difficult
and costly in other areas.333
III. Reframing the Debate: A Post-Human Rights Agenda for International
Law
International human rights law, as described above, imposes costs on
international law as a whole. This Part considers a range of possible
responses. It suggests that international law and the United Nations should
not double down on the decaying human rights enforcement architecture, but
should instead turn to developing a strong core of sovereignty-protecting
international legal norms devoted to protecting international peace and
cooperation. Doing so may promote international cooperation and protect the
territorial peace. It would also reduce broken window costs by relaxing the
claim that human rights must be enforced as binding international law and by
focusing on a smaller set of more vigorously enforced norms. The benefits of
such an approach depend in part, however, on the umesolved debate about
whether and how international law effectively advances human rights. The
arguments proffered here are accordingly tentative and are not intended to be
dispositive.
A.

Protecting the "Territorial Peace"

International law might, for a variety of reasons described in Parts I and
II, be best used not to secure a broad set of poorly enforced human rights but
instead to promote territorial stability. Doing so might in turn help secure the
territorial peace. There are several important potential counterarguments,
including that the literature on the "territorial peace" only discusses interstate
conflicts, not civil wars and other internal or cross-border conflicts, and so
the relationship between international law and peace is not fully understood.
That is true, and more empirical work on the causes of noninterstate armed
conflict would be helpful, but in any event interstate conflict remains an
important potential threat which international law may help diminish.
333. This Part does not address the potential benefits of noncompliance. See Jacob Katz Cogan,
Noncompliance and the International Rule ofLaw, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 189, 193 (2006) (defending
noncompliance based on its role in developing new norms and enforcing current law). See generally
Timothy Meyer, Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form ofInternational Law, 27 EUR.
J. lNT'L L. 161 (2016) (explaining that states use noncompliance as a renegotiation strategy).
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A second counterargument is that the "democratic peace" suggests that
in order to promote peace international law should promote human rights.334
If international human rights law makes countries more "democratic" as that
term is defined in the empirical literature, it may promote interstate peace.
One problem with this argument is that democratic countries are apparently
more peaceful only in their relations with other democracies, but not with
nondemocratic countries.335 Still, if all countries were democracies, the data
suggests the world would be more peaceful. To this extent, promoting
democracy also promotes peace. A more intractable difficulty, however, is
the weak relationship between human rights and "democracy" as defined in
the democratic peace literature.
A "democracy" as defined by democratic peace literature is not the same
as a human rights-respecting regime. The empirical measures of democracy
used in the democratic peace literature are provided by the "Polity IV"
database.336 The Polity IV dataset users' manual explains that "democracy"
has three elements: the ability of citizens to express effective policy
preferences, institutional constraints on executive power, and civil
liberties.337 But the Polity IV database only includes information on the first
two elements-not on civil liberties, which would have the clearest
relationship to human rights. A human right to democracy, as discussed
above in section I(A)(3), would have a close relationship to the "democracy"
of the "democratic peace." Intervention (military or otherwise) to ensure a
democratic form of government would thus appear to have long-term peace
benefits_:__if the intervenors succeed in their mission. But military
interventions to promote democracy have a dismal track record, from the
ongoing failures in Libya and Iraq to those in Haiti.338
There is also evidence that for pairs of states that both respect human
rights, military conflict with each other is less likely, even controlling for
democracy. The "human rights" peace has not been tested as extensively as
either the territorial or the democratic peace. One study shows, however, that
pairs of countries that protect physical integrity rights (torture, political
imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance) and empowerment
rights (freedom of speech, assembly and association, worker rights, freedom
334. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
335. SOBEK, supra note 154,at 51, 84-85; see also POSNER,supra note 14,at 126.
336. See, e.g., Johann Park,Forward to the Future? The Democratic Peace After the Cold War,
30 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE Ser. 178, 182 (2013) (describing studies that use Polity IV); Douglas
M. Gibler, Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict, 51 INT'L STUD. Q.
509,521 (2007) (using Polity IV); see also David Sobek et al., The Human Rights Peace: How the
Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad, 68 J. POL. 519,519 (2006) (noting the
difference between human rights and democracy scores on the Polity scale).
337. MONTY G. MARSHALL ET AL., POLITY IV PROJECT (POLITICAL REGIME
CHARACTERJSTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800-2015): DATASET USERS' MANuAL 14 (2016).
338. See Philippe R. Girard, Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti, 24
J. CONFLICT STUD., no. 1, 2004, at 20, 31-34 .
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of religion, and political participation) are less likely to engage in military
conflict with each other, whether or not they are democratic.339 This study
has some anomalies-it does not appear to show democratic peace, for
example.340 Another study has shown that there is also an "abusers' peace"
states with the worst human rights records are "relatively more peaceful with
similarly abusive states."341
There is, however, an additional problem with the claim that
international human rights law has helped create either the democratic or the
human rights peace. Even if human rights are correlated with peace between
some pairs of states, the extent to which international human rights law
generated or sustained those human rights would be difficult to measure in
most situations. The protection of human rights is provided for in an
overlapping set of regional human rights systems as well as domestic
statutory and constitutional law, in addition to binding and nonbinding
international legal instruments. The same is not true of international law,
which limits conflicts over territory. The basis of that system-indeed a key
basis for post-World War II international law-is the prohibition on the use
of force against the territorial integrity of another state, which is not an issue
meaningfully regulated by domestic law or by regional court systems.
B.

Refocusing the Work of the United Nations

A second response would be for the principal organs of the United
Nations to narrow and focus their work, so as to reduce credibility and
polarization costs, thereby improving the organization's overall effectiveness
and reputation. Since the end of the Cold War human rights have become an
important aspect of the United Nations' overall mission. Even the U.N.
bodies explicitly tasked only with human rights are, however, generally
unable to make clear progress.342 Moreover, human rights appear to be
divisive, leading to polarization and lack of progress on other substantive
issues.343 And the -enlarged mandate to include human rights has also
generated credibility costs for the United Nations as whole, and the Security
Council in particular.344
To reduce or eliminate these problems, the United Nations might forgo
efforts to develop or enforce international human rights law. To be sure, it
may be difficult to distinguish the promotion of human rights generally from
339. Sobek et al., supra note 336, at 519-25; cf Mary Caprioli & Peter F. Trwnbore,Human
Rights Rogues in Interstate Disputes, 1980-2001, 43 J. PEACE RES. 131 (2006).
340. Sobek et al., supra note 336, at 525. The authors hypothesize that the democratic peace
was really just a "Cold War peace." A recent study suggests otherwise. See Park, supra note 336.
341. Timothy M. Peterson & Leah Graham,Shared Human Rights Norms and Military Conflict,
55 J. CONFLICT RES. 248,249 (2011).
342. See supra subpart I(C).
343. See supra subpart I(C).
344. See supra subpart II(C).
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the application of international human rights law. To solve the broken
windows problem, the focus should be on legal norms which go unenforced.
The distinction is less significant, however, when it comes to credibility
costs, polarization, and lack of cooperation which could result from the
promotion of human rights generally, not just from its enforcement through
law. Separating out legal and nonlegal enforcement mechanisms is also
difficult. Even if human rights are not enforced through international law,
their enforcement through domestic law and in other ways might be enhanced
by having them included in major human rights treaties. Thus, this Part
proposes leaving the treaties in place but acknowledging that their
commitments are soft and refocusing the work of the United Nations away
from human rights and their legal enforcement.
Disbanding the treaty bodies and the Human Rights Council may not be
possible under current human rights treaties, but those bodies could, for
example, focus less of their attention on human rights as an international
legal obligation, reducing the broken windows problems associated with
legal norms that are widely violated. The idea would be to take the potential
positive effects of iterative engagement with these bodies without the claim
that each human rights commitment is a binding legal obligation.
The Paris Agreement on climate is structured in this way. The
Agreement itself is binding, as are the reporting requirements, but states
select their own nationally determined contributions to reducing greenhouse
gasses, which they then "aim" to achieve. 345 Research suggests that the
iterative process of reviewing and reporting on human rights before an
international body improves human rights practices. 346 The "Paris Model"
would preserve and enhance these processes, while acknowledging that not
all countries are going to meet all human rights obligations at the same pace.
The Paris Agreement itself was structured to convince as many states as
possible to join. 347 Human rights agreements have a different problem:
countries join the agreements, but the challenge lies in enforcement. Yet the
Paris Agreements' benefits in terms of "transparency and accountability"
might provide on-the-ground benefits for efforts to improve human rights,
even if the legal character of the obligations themselves have changed. The
Paris Agreement was designed in part to "drive deeper roots into the domestic
policy making processes that will be so key to the success of the kinds of
legal, social, and economic transformations that will be necessary to achieve

345. Multinational Agreement on Climate Change, art. 4, openedfor signature Apr. 22, 2016,
T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (entered in force Nov. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
346. Creamer & Simmons, supra note 8; de Bu.rca, supra note 8.
347. JACOB WERKSMAN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 7
(Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/other_areas_of_interest/events/event_documents/Brodies
LectureontheLega!CharacteroftheParisAgreementFinalBICCLEdinburgh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
TJT4-Z8X7].
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the Agreement's ambitious goals."348 Exactly the same kinds of
transformation are necessary to the protection and promotion of human
rights.
The U.N. General Assembly and Security Council could focus their
attention on the many pressing issues other than human rights--either their
legal enforcement or their promotion more generally-to avoid credibility
and polarization costs. Efforts to protect human rights through other
institutions and mechanisms could be redoubled. The result might be a more
credible, less polarized United Nations, and a more effective protection of
human rights.
Other proposals to reform the United Nations are consistent with the
foregoing in important ways. In order to increase the General Assembly's
declining prestige, for example, others have suggested that it needs to have
greater authority over a circumscribed, more limited agenda--one that
includes few, if any, human rights issues.349 Similarly, many view the human
rights work of the specialized U.N. bodies as politicized and arbitrary; going
so far as to argue that it "has sullied the UN's reputation, cast doubt on its
legitimacy," and "led to diminished national support and popular support"
for the organization as a whole.350 The author suggests doubling down on
human rights enforcement, an option addressed below. 351 Even if the
proposed solution is different, however, the problems with the current system
provide important common ground.
Consider how reform along the lines proposed here would improve the
work of the United Nations Security Council. As an initial matter, note that
the Security Council is well-positioned to play a vital role in global affairs.
Although critics have charged that the composition of the Security Council
no longer represents the distribution of global power, in fact the five
permanent members of the Council still reflect a large share of global
economic and military power, based on their percentage of global GDP, 352 on

348. Id.
349. See, e.g., SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 197, at 26--27 (2013); see also G.A. Res. 68/307
(Sept. 10, 2014) (emphasizing "the need to further enhance the role, authority, effectiveness and
efficiency of the General Assembly"); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ml 158-64, annex ,r 8, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005
(Mar. 21,2005) (noting that the General Assembly's agenda is too broad and should be focused on
issues like migration and terrorism).
350. SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 197,at 114-15,124.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 385-93.
352. 1n 1950, the P-5 share of global GDP was 52%. 1n 2009,it was 38%,and it rose to 41% in
2014. See Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Variable Multipolarity and U.N. Security Council Reform, 53
HARV. INT'LL.J. 450,459 tbl.3,460 tbl.4 (2012); see also GDP as Share of World GDP at PPP by
Country,
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?
end=2014&locations=CN-US-GB-FR-RU-1W &start=2009&view=chart [https://perma.cc/86WP
NBWJ].
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GDP per capita of P-5 countries as compared to other countries,353 on military
spending,354 and on the share of the world's military personnel.355 What has
changed substantially in the recent past is Russia's willingness to use force,
especially in the Middle East, increasing the significance of P-5 military
power.356 Today, the road to solving global problems runs right through
China, Russia, the United States, and Europe (represented in the P-5 by
France and the U.K.).
These geopolitical facts create an opportunity for the Security Council
to act as an important forum for international legal cooperation. But the
opportunity is generated in part by the global rise in power of Russia and
China, countries which have made increasingly clear in the last few years
by deed and word-that they disagree with the Western human rights
agenda.357 If the Security Council becomes more active and more effective,
it will probably not be around a common aim of providing strong and
effective protections for human rights.
Instead, common ground lies in the core purpose of the Security Council
itself: ensuring international peace and security.358 Failure to appreciate this
point with respect to Syria is part of what led to the eventual marginalization
of both the United States and the Security Council in belated efforts to broker
a ceasefire in 2016. The Obama administration's focus on removing Bashar
al-Assad from power, in part because of his poor human rights record,
generated conflict with Russia and stymied Security Council efforts to

353. In 2010, the average GDP per capita, PPP, of the P-5 was 30,072. The world average was
12,828. In 2015 the numbers were 35,221 and 15,546 respectively. GDP Per Capita, PPP (Current
International $), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD
?end=20 l 5&locations=CN-US-RU-GB-FR-l W&start=2010 [https://perma.cc/MVX4-EW2J].
354. The P-5 share of global military spending was 59% in 2015. See Sam Perlo-Freeman et
al., SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015, STOCKHOLM !NT'L PEACE RES.
INST., Apr. 2016, at 2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EMBARG0%20FS1604
%20Milex%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TSQ-SBLP]. It was 61% in 2010 and 78% in 1950. See
Szewczyk, supra note 352.
355. The only indicator that declined significantly is military personnel: the P-5 had 22% of the
world's military personnel in 2014, 26% in 2010, and 63% in 1950. See Szewczyk, supra note 352;
Armed Forces Personnel, Total, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
MS.MIL. TOTL.P1?end=20 l 4&locations=FR-CN-US-RU-GB-l W&start=2010 [https://perma.cc/
R5MA-8XTM].
356. See Itamar Rabinovich, The Russian-U.S. Relationship in the Middle East: A Five-Year
Projection, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT'L PEACE (Apr. 5, 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/
2016/04/05/russian-u.s.-relationship-in-middle-east-five-year-proj ection-pub-63243 [https://perma
.cc/C87S-6QW2].
357. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: WORLD REPORT 2016, supra note 18, at 476; see Relations with
Russia, supra note 175; Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, supra note
146.
358. See Bruce Jones, The Security Council and Changing Distribution of Power (arguing for
strengthening the Security Council's role in maintaining state integrity), in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 139, at 793, 798.
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resolve the conflict.359 The U.S.-led agenda of ousting Qaddafi, in part for
human rights reasons, angered Russia and China, ultimately impeding U.N.
Security Council action in Syria.360 Of course, in both situations, the United
States also had strategic reasons to favor regime change, 361 but that fact only
strengthens the view that human rights norms are selectively enforced to
serve other interests.
Critics argue that the Security Council's biggest post-Cold War failures
have been those of omission: failures to act in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and
now Syria. 362 Indeed, the failure to act is the problem that R2P was supposed
to solve, so it seems counterintuitive to argue that by abandoning
humanitarian-based intervention, the Security Council will become more
effective and relevant. However, these criticisms of the Security Council
overlook its success at maintaining a great powers peace and peace among
nation states more generally, risks which are sometimes discounted.363 But as
Robert Kagan recently argued, interstate territorial conflict is a real danger:
the decline of U.S. power, the growth of Chinese and Russian power, and
territorial ambitions of these two powers which aim to shake up the existing
global order, is a recipe for large-scale armed conflict. 364 International law
that diminishes such risks remains vitally important today, as it has since the
U.N. Charter was drafted.
C.

Human Rights: Is International Law Necessary?

An alternative response to the decline in human rights and the costs of
human rights to the rest of international law would be to enforce--or at least
take seriously the enforcement of-international human rights law.

359. See, e.g., Shaik & Roberts, supra note 146, at 723-25, 733; Jason Ukman & Liz Sly,
Obama: Syrian President Assad Must Step Down, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2011), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/obama-syrian-president-assad-must
stepdown/2011 /08/18/gIQAM75UNJ_blog.html?-utm_term=.6e4e60573757
[https://perma.cc/
AG3T-LATT]; Macon Phillips, President Obama: "The Future of Syria Must Be Determined by Its
People, but President Bashar al-Assad Is Standing in Their Way", WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18,
2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be
determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad [https://perma.cc/3FGS-4BQ5]; Steven Mufson,
"Assad Must Go": These Three Little Words Are Huge Obstacles for Obama on Syria, WASH. POST
(Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/assad-must-go-these-three
little-words-present-a-huge-obstacle-for-obama-on-syria/2015/10/19/6a76baba-71ec-11e5-9cbb790369643cf9_story.html?utm_term=.849f34bal c4e [https://perma.cc/WRH6-YZ7B].
360. See supra text accompanying notes 147, 335.
361. See Christopher Fermor, NATO's Decision to Intervene in Libya (2011): Realist Principles
or Humanitarian Norms?, 8 J. POL. & INT'L STUD., no. 2, 2012, at 323.
362. See Szewczyk, supra note 352, at 454.
363. Id.
364. Robert Kagan, Backing into World War Ill, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/
[https://perma.cc/W4JS-FZ7F]; see also GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA
AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES'S TRAP? (2017) (describing risk of conflict with China).
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Enforcing "binding" international human rights law would solve the broken
windows problem. It would make the United Nations more credible, reduce
polarization, and arguably merits whatever expenditures necessary, assuming
that human rights themselves would improve. But there is disagreement
about the effectiveness of international law in protecting human rights. And
serious efforts at enforcing human rights through international law are
politically infeasible.
Empirical scholarship on the effectiveness of international human rights
law has focused primarily on treaty ratification, an easily measured variable.
There is very little work, by contrast, on whether the doctrinal innovations to
enforce human rights had a meaningful impact. The ratification of certain
treaties has had modest positive effects on human rights practices of some
countries, while ratification of others has not, and some studies even show a
correlation between the ratification of certain human rights treaties and more
human rights violations. 365 A recent overview of the large body of relevant
empirical work concludes, for example, that the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has shown the most
impressive results, with small gains for women's political rights and the
education of girls in some countries. 366 For other treaties, the correlation
between ratification and improved human rights outcomes is weaker or even
nonexistent. 367
A consistent finding across issue areas and across studies is that positive
effects of ratifying human rights treaties are correlated with particular
domestic conditions within ratifying countries. 368 Beth Simmons has
developed this claim in the most detail. 369 Ratification can influence domestic
politics under certain circumstances by influencing elite agendas, providing

365. E.g., Daniel W. Hill Jr., Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State
Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161, 1172 (2010) (finding that "the ratification of [the Convention Against

Torture] is associated with worse torture practice than would be expected in the absence of
ratification").
366. Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime,
56 VA. J. INT'L L. 459, 467-68 (citing Hill Jr., supra note 365; Yonantan Lupu, The Information
Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 912 (2013)).
367. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at 1940; Hill Jr., supra note 365, at 1161, 1172; Cope &
Creamer, supra note 366, at 467.
368. See, e.g., Wade M. Cole, Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human
Rights Treaties, 69 INT'L ORG. 405, 433-34 (2015) (showing a correlation between effective
bureaucracies and improved rights protections after ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights); see also Cope & Creamer, supra note 366, at 476-78 (summarizing a
number of studies that suggest the post-ratification process within a state matters to its compliance
with the treaty).
369. SIMMONS, supra note 264, at 125-48.
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a focal point for national lawmaking, enabling litigation in national courts,
and sparking mass political mobilization. 370
The significance of domestic politics and law to the enforcement of
international human rights law suggests that today-after human rights
treaties have been widely ratified-human rights can perhaps be enforced
just as well through domestic and transnational legal work as they can
through international law. To consider this claim, note that the positive
effects of treaty ratification on rights practices can be separated into two
groups. First, there are the benefits conferred by ratification itself. For
example, elites, policy makers, and domestic interest groups may be
mobilized by the process of treaty ratification. 371 The ratification process
itself might also create longer term effects by generating changes in domestic
statutes, regulations, bureaucratic structure, and even civil society. 372 All of
these benefits have already been conferred through the process of ratification.
A new approach to enforcement and implementation of human rights treaties
would have no effect, except perhaps on the few states which have not ratified
human rights treaties.
Second, however, treaty ratification might generate positive human
rights outcomes through the domestic legal and political effect of ongoing
efforts to enforce the treaty as international law, as distinct from the benefits
conferred by ratification itself. Far less work attempts to measure these
second effects specifically, and the results are generally mixed. 373 One
forthcoming study measures the effect of both self-reporting to the
Committee Against Torture and of the ensuing review process. Controlling
for a wide variety of factors, it concludes with "moderate confidence" that
some countries which go through the reporting and review process more than
once have a small reduction in the incidence of torture. 374 It also shows that
the reporting and review process tends to be covered in the press in Latin

370. Id. at 138-39, 147; see also Yonatan Luptu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in
Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT'L ORG. 469
(2013); Emilia Justyna Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton, Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human
Rights Treaty Violation, 53 lNT'L STUD. Q. 149 (2009).
371. See Cope & Creamer, supra note 366, at 475-77 (observing the attention that the
negotiation and ratification process receives and recognizing that after a state's ratification of an
international treaty, these new regulations may take years to "diffuse into . . . local law and
custom").
372. Id.
373. One study uses the decision to accept a treaty's individual and interstate complaint
procedures as an independent variable and finds that it is associated with better rights practices,
worse rights practices, or has no effect, depending on the treaty in question. Wade M. Cole, Human
Rights as Myth and Ceremony/Reevaluating the Effectiveness ofHuman Rights Treaties, 117 AM.
J. soc. 1331, 1337-42, 1363 (2012).
374. Creamer & Simmons, supra note 8, at 15.
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America, suggesting that the positive effect of the review process may take
place through domestic political mobilization. 375
Leaving aside the moderate confidence level in a modest effect, and
assuming that the results would hold for other treaty regimes, 376 it may be
possible to achieve the measured effects even if human rights commitments
were not characterized as legally binding international law. One way of
maximizing benefits and minimizing costs might be to acknowledge that
international human rights are-in some senses-soft international legal
obligations, although they are often included in binding domestic law.
Domestic enforcement mechanisms may be effective without ongoing
enforcement through international law. In order to evaluate the possibility
empirically, we would need to distinguish between the domestic pressures
that result from binding international commitment and those that result from
nonbinding international instruments. Some experimental work supports this
conclusion by finding that soft international human rights norms have the
same effect on people's perceptions as hard international law. 377
Most substantive human rights obligations are today imposed by an
overlapping set of instruments that includes nonbinding international norms
like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; treaty obligations; regional
human rights agreements and tribunals; and domestic constitutions, statutes,
and common law. 378 Relaxing the claim that international human rights
treaties and custom are formally enforceable as binding international law
would accordingly leave open many enforcement options including "naming
and shaming," transnational human rights advocacy movements, soft or
nonbinding norms, active civil society, iterative engagement with
international review bodies, domestic enforcement procedures, diplomatic
pressure, regional human rights enforcement, conditioning of development
aid, and so on. We also know that some of the most important victories for
worldwide human rights have been achieved through these methods,
including the role of the nonbinding Helsinki Accords in bringing about the

375. Id. at 15-23.
376. But cf Cope & Creamer, supra note 366, at 479 (showing that many results vary from
treaty to treaty).
377. Geoffrey P. R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An
Experimental Study, 67 INT'L ORG. 105, 105, 127-29 (2013); see also Stephen Meili, The Human
Rights of Non-Citizens: Constitutionalized Treaty Law in Ecuador, 31 GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 347, 385
n.180 (2017) (describing the effect of the nonbinding Cartagena Declaration on domestic legal·
protections of noncitizens). But cf Adam S. Chilton, The Influence ofInternational Human Rights
Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 110, 127-28 (2014)
( describing an experimental study on adults in the United States that showed less support for solitary
confinement among those who were told that the practice violated international law).
378. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (3d ed. 2009);
FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
LAW: TREATIES, CASES, AND ANALYSIS (2005).
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end of the Cold War. 379 It is a great achievement of the human rights
movement that so many human rights are protected in so many different,
overlapping ways----direct enforcement of the global treaties may no longer
be necessary.
Many readers will disagree with even the suggestion of turning away
from the international legal enforcement of human rights. At a minimum,
however, it work on human rights outcomes should be accompanied by more
and better work on the costs of international human rights enforcement,
including cooperation and broken windows costs. A striking feature of the
scholarship on human rights is the assumption that human rights treaties and
their enforcement regimes have no costs, except possibly to human rights
themselves. Even very modest, statistically weak, or otherwise unclear gains
in human rights protections are defensible if there are no costs. But as David
Kennedy cautions: "[w]e should be on guard when someone seeks to recruit
us to a project that only has upsides."380
There is a second problem with doubling down on the enforcement of
human rights through international law-it is not politically feasible. China,
Russia, . and what seems to be a growing number of other countries
increasingly reject the enforcement of human rights through international
law. Indeed, a largely unnoticed aspect of the shift towards a multipolar
international order is an increasingly pointed conflict about international law
generally and about human rights in particular. 381 A 2016 joint Chinese
Russian declaration on international law illustrates the point. 382 Unlike earlier
declarations, the one from 2016 speaks not in terms of "universal" norms in
international law, nor does it mention human rights. 383 China and Russia also
379. See SARAH B. SNYDER, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTMSM AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: A
TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE HELSINKI NETWORK 1-2 (2011); see generally Zachary Elkins
et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights
Practice, 54 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 61 (2013) (finding that the nonbinding Universal Declaration of
Human Rights played an important role in the spread of human rights into domestic constitutions).
380. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Regime: Still Part of the Problem, in
EXAMINING CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 27 (Rob Dickinson et al. eds., 2012);
see also David Kennedy, International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 101, 102 (2002).
381. See William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment
and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (noting that few authors have considered
"how changes in the distribution of power influence the processes and substance of international
law").
382. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Federation, The Declaration of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law (June 25,
2016),
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/position_word_order/-/asset_publisher/
6S4RuXfeY!Kr/content/id/2331698 [https://perma.cc/6CN7-N3J8] [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
383. Cf Communiques, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Joint Statement of the People's
Republic of China and Russian Federation on Major International Issues (May 23, 2008),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_6653 85/2649_665393/t465821.shtml
[https://perma.cc/6PBT-N7T5] (reiterating China and Russia's respect for human rights);
Communiques, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century
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have a growing influence on the approach that many countries take to
international law, including Brazil, India, and South Africa.384 Turkey
illustrates the newfound power of China and Russia-and the centrality of
human rights to their growing control over the content of international law.
Turkey has become increasingly autocratic since the government thwarted a
coup attempt in 2016.385 Human rights have long been a major stumbling
block to Turkey's admission to the European Union; in response to the post
coup human rights _violations, Europe has threatened to end the (recently re
opened) process of admitting Turkey.386 Turkey, on the other hand, has
explicitly threatened to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a
security and economic bloc led by China and Russia.387 Whatever the
ultimate outcome of this particular dispute-and Turkey has a long history
of violent conflict with Russia-the growing power of Russian and Chinese
approaches to international law is clear.
Doubling down on the international legal protection of human rights is
not feasible for other reasons. A serious enforcement effort might involve the
doctrines described in Part I, except on a far broader scale than previous
efforts. The true cost of human rights enforcement would involve potentially
great costs to the friendly relations of states and even interstate peace. It could
mean stepping up civil and criminal universal jurisdiction prosecutions and
eliminating immunity even in cases involving U.S., Chinese, or Israeli
defendants tried in foreign national courts. Taking seriously a right of
secession as a meaningful tool to improve human rights would involve
secessions from human rights-violating states, potentially including Russia,
Turkey, China, and others. The high costs to interstate relations are clear.
Unlike international human rights law, there is not an overlapping set of

World Order ('t'fft!kr211l:ttc!Efl;i;�ffl'r,Jlfxil-Ja1JJ3) (July 1, 2005), http://www.mfa.
gov.cn/chn//gxh/zlb/smgg/t201988.htm [https://perma.cc/4KFB-KDUAJ (emphasizing respect for
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and state sovereignty); Russian-Chinese Joint
Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, in letter
dated May 15, 1997 from the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation to
the United Nations, Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/52/153-s/1997/384 (May 20,
1997) (mentioning and respecting "universally recognized principles of international law").
384. Burke-White, supra note 381, at 2, 4, 7; see also GIDEON RACHMAN, EASTERNIZATION:
ASIA'S RISE AND AMERICA'S DECLINE FROM OBAMA TO TRUMP AND BEYOND 14, 212-24 (2016).
385. Tim Arango & Ceylan Yeginsu, Turkish President Returns to Istanbul in Sign Military
Coup Is Faltering, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/
world/europe/military-attempts-coup-in-turkey-prime-minister-says.html [https://perma.cc/MK.29SEAH].
386. Rod Nordland & James Kanter, Turkey and E. U Near Breaking Point in Membership
Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/world/europe/turkey-eu
membership-talks.html [https://perma.cc/BZ77-T3LM].
387. Samuel Osborne, Turkey Could Join Bloc with Russia and China Instead ofEU, President
Erdogan Says, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 20, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/turkey-president-erdogan-eu-russia-china-a7428391.html [https ://perma.cc/896F-TK65].
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international and domestic prohibitions on interstate war. Only international
law can do that work.
IV. Conclusion
International human rights law, despite its many historical successes, is
no longer in its golden age. The beneficiary may be international law as a
whole. But the benefits will be fully realized only if those who create and
shape international law consider carefully the dangers and opportunities that
the decline presents. At a minimum, scholars should focus not only on the
decades-old debate about international human rights law and human rights,
but instead on international human rights law and international law as a
system. As this Article has shown, empirical work and models drawn from
political science, social psychology, and sociology all suggest that human
rights have imposed costs on international law and on international peace and
security. Examples bear out what the models predict.
Of particular significance, because the stakes involved are so high, is
empirical work showing a strong correlation between territorial disputes and
armed conflict. Some aspects of the human rights transformation of
international law have undermined international legal norms and institutions
designed to limit such conflicts. It is easy to think that large-scale interstate
war is simply impossible under contemporary conditions, due to
globalization, international economic ties, and the deadly weapons available.
That same view was prominent just over a century ago, on the eve of World
War I. 388 The remarkable contribution that international law has apparently
made to interstate peace may be the great success of post-World War II
international law. It is well worth preserving today through vigorous and
credible international institutions such as the United Nations and through
international legal norms, which are as strong and robust as possible.

388. See, e.g., FLORIAN ILLIES, 1913: DER SOMMER DES JAHRHUNDERTS (2013) (discussing
the work ofNorman Angell, including his book The Great Illusion).

